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Unmanned aircraft are relied on now more than ever to save lives and support the 
troops in the recent Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The 
demands for UAS capabilities are rapidly increasing in the civilian sector. However, UAS 
operations will not be carried out in the NAS until safety concerns are alleviated. Among 
these concerns is determining the appropriate level of automation in conjunction with a 
suitable pilot who exhibits the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to safely operate 
these systems. 
This research examined two levels of automation: Management by Consent 
(MBC) and Management by Exception (MBE). User experiences were also analyzed in 
conjunction with both levels of automation while operating an unmanned aircraft 
simulator. The user experiences encompass three individual groups: Pilots, ATC, and 
Human Factors. Performance, workload, and situation awareness data were examined, 
but did not show any significant differences among the groups. Shortfalls and constraints 
are heavily examined to help pave the wave for future research. 
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Glossary of Terms 
The following definitions are provided by the Federal Aviation Administration and 
ASTM International: 
Airworthiness 
For the UAS to be considered airworthy, both the aircraft and all of the other 
associated support equipment of the UAS must be in a condition for safe operation. 
If any element of the systems is not in condition for safe operation, then the 
unmanned aircraft would not be considered airworthy. 
Automated 
The automatic performance of scripted action 
Autonomy 
The ability of the machine to interpret its environment and make decision that result 
in unscripted actions. 
Chase Aircraft 
A manned aircraft flying in close proximity to an unmanned aircraft that carries, in 
addition to the pilot in command (PIC) of the aircraft, a qualified visual observer. 
Control station 
A system of computers and other equipment in a designated operating area that the 
pilot and other crewmembers use to communicate and fly the unmanned aircraft and 
to operate its sensors (if any). 
Fully autonomous 
Mode of control of a UAS where the UAS is expected to execute its mission, within 
the pre-programmed scope , with only monitoring from the pilot-in-command. As a 
descriptor for mode of control, this term includes: (1) fully automatic operation, (2) 
autonomous functions (like takeoff, landing, or collision avoidance), (3) "intelligent" 
fully autonomous operation. 
Line of sight 
Direct, point-to-point contact between a transmitter and receiver. 
Lost link 
A situation where the control station has lost either or both of the uplink and 
downlink contact with the unmanned aircraft and the pilot can no longer affect or 
monitor, or both, the aircraft's flight. 
Mode of control 
Means the pilot uses to direct the activity of the UAS. There are two modes of 
control: semi-autonomous and remote control. A UAS may use different modes of 
control in different phases of flight. 
Operator 
Means any person who causes or authorizes the operation of an aircraft, such as the 
owner, lessee, or bailee of an aircraft. Also, the entity responsible for compliance 
with airworthiness and continuing airworthiness requirements. 
Pilot in Command 
The person who has final authority and responsibility for the operation and safety of 
flight, has been designated as pilot in command before or during the flight, and holds 
the appropriate category, class, and type rating, if appropriate, for the conduct of the 
x 
flight. The responsibility and authority of the pilot in command as described by 14 
CFR 91.3, Responsibility and Authority of the Pilot in Command, apply to the 
unmanned aircraft PIC. The pilot in command position may rotate duties as 
necessary with equally qualified pilots. The individual designated as PIC may 
change during flight. 
Semi-autonomous 
Mode of control of a UAS where the pilot executes changes and conducts the 
mission through a flight management system interface. Without this input, the UAS 
will perform pre-programmed automatic operations. This can, but might not, include 
some fully autonomous functions (like takeoff, landing, and collisions avoidance) 
Unmanned Aircraft 
A device used or intended to be used for flight in the air that has no onboard pilot. 
This includes all classes of airplanes, helicopters, airships, and translational lift 
aircraft that have no onboard pilot. Unmanned aircraft are understood to include only 
those aircraft controllable in three axes and therefore, exclude traditional balloons 
Unmanned Aircraft System 
Airplane, airship, powered lift, or rotorcraft that operates with the pilot in command 
off-board, for purposes other than sport of recreation, also known as unmanned aerial 
vehicle. UASs are designed to be recovered and reused. A UAS system includes all 
parts of the system (data-link, control station, and so forth) required to operate the 
aircraft. The plural of UAS is UASs. 
Visual Line-of-Sight 
A method of control and collision avoidance that refers to the pilot or observer 
directly viewing the unmanned aircraft with human eyesight. Corrective lenses 
(spectacles or contact lenses) may be used by the pilot or visual observer. Aids to 
vision, such as binoculars, field glasses, or telephoto television may be employed as 
long as their field of view does not adversely affect the surveillance task. 
Visual Observer 
A trained person who assists the unmanned aircraft pilot in the duties associated with 
collision avoidance. This includes, but is not limited to, avoidance of other traffic, 
clouds, obstructions and terrain. 
(AIR-160, 2008; ASTM F-2395-07, 2007) 
xi 
The Effect of Learned 1 
Introduction 
The crucial issue is the assimilation of the relevant sensory inputs, the processing of 
information pertinent to specified user goals, and the translation of the user's subsequent 
decisions into effective action. The fundamental barrier to success in this realm is not a 
technological one but a user-centered one. 
- Oron-Gilad, Chen, and Hancock, 2006 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) are on the verge of taking flight alongside 
manned aircraft in the national airspace system (NAS). These unmanned systems have 
demonstrated their true potential through military endeavors, and their wide range of 
capabilities has inspired civilian agencies to harness the benefits that these systems 
provide. UAS has great potential to change the aviation arena forever, but special 
attention must be made to safety concerns associated with separating the pilot from the 
unmanned aircraft. The intent of this thesis is to analyze how the human is safely 
integrated into this highly automated and very complex system. 
Currently, there is no universally supported definition for modern-day UASs. The 
Department of Defense (DoD) defines these systems as, "A powered, aerial vehicle that 
does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly 
autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a 
lethal or non-lethal payload. Ballistic or semi ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and 
artillery projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles " (Department of 
Defense, 2005). The FAA defines an UAS as an: "Airplane, airship, powered lift, or 
rotorcraft that operates with the pilot in command off-board, for purposes other than 
sport of recreation, also known as unmanned aerial vehicle. UASs are designed to be 
recovered and reused. A UAS system includes all parts of the system (data-link, control 
station, and so forth) required to operate the aircraft. The plural of UAS is UASs. " In 
1 
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either case, a pilot is not co-located within the flying component of the system. This 
creates several human factors concerns regarding how the pilot is then integrated into the 
system to maintain adequate control (Hottman & Sortland, 2006). 
Of primary importance is the skill-set required on behalf of the pilot to safely and 
effectively fly the unmanned aircraft from a distance. The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) has developed a number of certification requirements that must be 
met in order to fly manned aircraft, or to monitor and direct aircraft as an air traffic 
controller (ATC). Certification requirements for pilots of unmanned aircraft have yet to 
be developed and little research has been done to evaluate the appropriate knowledge, 
skills, and abilities (KSAs) that an UAS pilot should possess (Williams, 2005). 
A full understanding of the three-dimensional aspect of the unmanned aircraft in 
the airspace cannot occur without prior experience in the airspace. So, it is logical to 
suggest that conventional pilots of manned aircraft are comprised with the fundamental 
KSAs necessary to develop an accurate mental representation of the unmanned aircrafts 
current status. However, research that assessed the applicability of pilot KSAs applied to 
UAS operations are rare and has arrived at conflicting conclusions (McCarley & 
Wickens, 2005; Tirre, 1998; Flach, 1998). Research that analyzes the transfer of non-
pilot KSA's, such as those pertaining to air traffic controller (ATC) and skilled computer 
gamers, could not be found. It is important to note that UAS applications, scenarios, and 
designs vary significantly, thus the skill-sets required on behalf of the pilots may be just 
as diverse. 
Of secondary importance is how these highly automated systems interact with the 
pilot to provide for a seamless and coordinated control effort. It is especially important in 
2 
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the design of UAS that automation strategies be integrated in a way that allows for the 
pilot to remain actively involved and aware of the functions taking place within the 
system. The high-performance nature of the system requires an extensive amount of 
autonomy in order to operate, but a fully-autonomous system would leave out important 
human oversight and is deemed unsafe. Therefore, an appropriate level of automation is 
critical to the safety and performance characteristics of UAS design. 
Currently, the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy calls for pilots with manned aircraft 
training, but this often results in a large amount of negative transfer effects when training 
them in a UAS environment (Pedersen, Cooke, Pringle, & Connor, 2006). The Human 
Systems Wing in the U.S. Air Force strongly recommends that, "Future work should 
focus on improving the empirical knowledge base on UAS human factors so evidence-
based recommendations can be made when incorporating control migration in UAS 
design and operations (Thompson et al., 2006)." The FAA Civil Aerospace Medical 
Institute furthers this notion, by acknowledging that much research is needed to assess the 
KSAs for future UAS pilots (Williams, 2005). With the growing reliance on autonomy, 
and the diminishing accessibility of human intervention, a superior control interface 
design has never been more necessary in the realm of aviation (Hughes, 2008). 
It is the intent of this current research to analyze the pilot's role in the UAS, and 
determine how the system best accommodates this role. Similar to manned aircraft, the 
pilot is directly responsible for insuring the overall safety of flight. For this reason, a 
human-centered approach will be assumed, rather than the mainstream technology-
centered approach that is common in UAS research and design. 
3 
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The layout of this thesis encompasses a broad literature review that should 
familiarize the reader with the intent of UAS operations. This will allow for a deeper 
understanding of what is expected on behalf of the UAS pilot, and the responsibilities 
that he/she must endure. Figure 1 outlines the structure of this thesis. To begin, a 
historical analysis will cover UAS development and its many real-world applications. 
This will be followed by a "system-of-systems" approach to UAS development and 
integration. There are many constraints and requirements that are imposed on UAS pilots 
and these will be discussed as well. The second half of the literature review will focus 
on the independent variables of main concern to this study: Experience (KSAs of Pilots 
and ATC) and Levels of Automation (Management by Consent and Management by 
Exception). 
-. .1 L jvelopment 
UAS Architecture 
Figure 1. Thesis Layout 
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UAS: A Historical Analysis 
Contrary to popular belief, initial concepts of these systems date back to the late 
1800's by a highly notable scientist named Nikola Tesla (Newcome, 2004). In 1884, 
Tesla first conceptualized the design of a heavier-than-air unmanned aircraft flown by 
remote control using AC current. Tesla adamantly believed that his theory could be 
achievable through the use of radio frequencies and a ground-based controller, but the 
concept was readily dismissed as unachievable (Newcome, 2004). During the next 100 
years, advancements in UASs occurred mainly as a result of wartime activities. Shortly 
after World War I, unmanned aircraft technologies really began to develop, following the 
advent of automatic stabilization, remote control, and autonomous navigation. Today, the 
military relies heavily on UASs to conduct missions that would otherwise be too boring, 
risky, or impractical for manned flight. These missions are often referred to as the "Dull, 
Dirty, or Dangerous " missions. 
As the components of these systems became more advanced, and the missions 
more diverse, the terminology to describe these technologies has also evolved. UASs 
have undergone several name changes in their relatively short history. Depending on their 
intended use, they have been most commonly referred to as Remotely Piloted Vehicles, 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and Remotely Operated Vehicles. The modern-day 
terminology, "Unmanned Aircraft Systems" was implemented to incorporate the entire 
system used to conduct the operation of these vehicles- inclusive of all the components 
required for operation (e.g. unmanned aircraft, CS, pilot, data-link, et al.) The timeline 
below depicts the chronology of names before it evolved into the term used today. 
5 
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Figure 2. Chronology of names applied to robotic aircraft (Newcome, 2004) 
Past UAS Operations 
It is popular belief that the first unmanned aircraft was developed in 1916 and was 
called the Aerial Target. Some would even argue that primitive examples of unmanned 
aircraft were used in at least two wars prior to the development of the airplane, and date 
back to the year 1818. During this year, French scientist Charles Rozier developed the 
first recorded unmanned balloon designed to fire rockets on a target. The differences in 
historical findings are often due to how one defines a unmanned aircraft. Prior to the 
development of the airplane, balloons were used in place of an airplane, but unmanned 
balloons would not meet the criteria for many of the modem day definitions of UAS. 
Newcome (2004) provides us with a graphical depiction (see Figure 3) on how UASs 
evolved into what we had today. The roots denote the inventors that realized the 
feasibility of UAS operations, and the branches indicate the several classifications of 
6 
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unmanned aircraft that exist today. Note that only some of these unmanned aircraft 
classifications illustrated by the branches would fall under the classical UAS definitions 
provided by the FAA and DoD. 
<**&» £% 
i »*h* 
Figure 3. UAS Evolutionary Tree (Newcome, 2004) 
Present UAS Operations 
UASs have been around for approximately 100 years, but it hasn't been until 
recently that their capabilities have been recognized. The enormous growth of military 
interest towards UAS is a direct result of their proven performance and capabilities in the 
realm of surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering, and more reeently-
attaek missions (Hottman & Sortland, 2006). This highly sought after technology quickly 
grew in reputation after it was responsible for defeating the Iraqi Republican Guard 
several days sooner then what could have been achieved with manned aircraft. In 2005 
alone, UASs had conducted over 100,000 flight hours in support of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. By the end of 2008 that number increased to 
7 
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nearly 500,000 flight hours (excluding hand-launched systems) (Department of Defense, 
2009). 
Furthermore, UAS flight operations accomplished this effort without putting 
American pilots' lives in danger, due to the missions being flown by pilots residing 
within the U.S. borders (Scarborough, 2003; Guidry & Wills, 2004). The first combat 
deployment of a very modern UAS, known as the RQ-4 Global Hawk, consisted of a 
team of 86 members, 56 of which were contractors needed to conduct the flight portion of 
this new equipment (Guidry & Wills, 2004). A timeline of past, present, and future usage 
of several military UAS platforms are depicted in Figure 4. 
1W5 1W) 1 W 7000 ?no«j 7010 ?f»1S 7020 Wi 7030 
• USA 
USAF 
Figure 4. Timeline of DoD UASs (Department of Defense, 2005) 
The tactical use of UASs surpassed the expectations of military commanders conducting 
wartime missions and the same is expected in civilian applications. 
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UAS Operational Diversity. The environment and intended mission scenarios in 
which UASs operate differ significantly. These technologies have advanced to the point 
where their application can be useful in many practical purposes such as drug 
interdiction, border monitoring, law enforcement, agriculture, communication relays, 
aerial photography and mapping, emergency management, and scientific and 
environmental research (Hottman, Gutman, & Witt, 2000; Nakagawa, Witt, & Hottman, 
2001). These platforms would also operate in a number of environments, inclusive of 
those set up by regulating authorities. These vary by a multiple of factors, including 
airspace, weather conditions, and altitude. To suffice for each intended method of 
operation, user-interfaces would ultimately need to be designed in a fashion that allows 
for the most effective means of operation, thereby requiring different operating tasks on 
behalf of the pilot (Hottman & Sortland, 2006). 
Methods of Control. The KSAs of UAS pilots would vary due to the wide range 
of operating platforms and user-interfaces that exist (Hottman & Sortland, 2006). Similar 
to manned flight, UASs have a wide range of uses, and the qualifications and 
certifications required for operation may differ depending on the intent of operation 
(O'hare & Roscoe, 1990). Some UASs are controlled from a hand-held device and 
remain in visual-line-of-sight (VLOS) where the pilot is controlling the aircraft within 
visual range. Highly automated methods of control require the pilot to establish 
waypoints, while automation is left to determine the appropriate aircraft settings to reach 
those destinations. On the other hand, some highly-autonomous UASs still require the 
pilot to operate the unmanned aircraft by manipulating the control surfaces from the 
control station (CS) in a similar fashion to fly-by-wire methods used in manned-flight. 
9 
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Current UAS Pilots. Currently, there is no consistency in UAS pilot selection. 
The U.S. Air Force tends to select UAS pilot candidates that have received formal 
military flight training, but have recently graduated their first class of pilots trained 
specifically for UAS operation (Brinkerhoff, 2009). The Navy and Marine Corp select 
UAS pilots that already hold a private pilot license, while the Army selects UAS pilots 
who have never even flown a manned aircraft (McCarley & Wickens, 2004). Tirre 
(1998) noted that pilots transitioning from manned aircraft to UAS operations have faced 
boredom and difficulty maintaining situation awareness. It is also documented that 
transitioning pilots have difficulty switching flight environments due to the lack of 
vestibular and "seat-of-the-pants" sensory input obtained in manned flight. Weeks 
(2000) performed limited research in this area and concluded that there is a wide range of 
necessary qualifications that exist among UAS pilots, and more research is necessary to 
identify the KSAs of pilots that would best fit into UAS operations. 
Future UAS Operations 
The 2009 FAA NextGen Implementation Plan has cited that UAS is on the verge 
of taking flight in the NAS. Within the U.S., there are four different markets that may 
greatly benefit from UAS operations: military, civil government, research, and 
commercial applications. It is important to note that each market will have different 
constraints imposed on UAS operations. Examples of these constraints consist of several 
areas, inclusive of accessible technologies, regulations, public acceptance, cost-benefit, 
and other operational constraints (DeGarmo & Maroney, 2008). Regulatory controls, for 
example, may restrict commercial UAS operations entirely. The success of UAS in each 
market is dependent on the constraints imposed on their operation. Assuming that UAS 
10 
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capabilities are not heavily suppressed in each respective market, the chart below outlines 
predictions on when specific markets will be able to benefit from this aspiring 
technology. 
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Figure 5. Current & Future UAS Potential Markets (DeGarmo & Maroney, 2008) 
The potential operating scenarios are limitless, but have already been deemed 
useful in areas pertaining to agriculture, homeland security, telecommunications, and 
scientific research firms (McCarley & Wickens, 2005). The United Kingdom is 
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anticipating the use of UASs for police and coastal patrol activities by the year 2012 
(BAE Systems, 2007). In the same timeframe rapid spending and advanced technologies 
will enable the U.S. military to use UASs for a much broader range of missions inclusive 
of the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, Electronic Attack, and Deep Strike 
Interdiction (Department of Defense, 2005). Additionally, the Air Force Research 
Laboratory (AFRL) is actively researching the capabilities of Small Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (SAVs) and Micro Aerial Vehicles (MAVs) to perform target detection and 
identification missions within urban environments (Hughes, 2008). An aerospace and 
defense consulting agency has predicted that the U.S. will spend nearly $55 billion over 
the next decade towards the Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) 
efforts of UAS technologies. These research efforts will be comprised of the most 
dynamic growth sectors of the worlds' aerospace industry (Teal Group, 2009). It is no 
longer a question as to //"unmanned systems will become a part of our everyday lives, but 
more of a question as to when. The technology is feasible; it's now a matter of 
determining the most safe and effective route to guide its success. Among the means of 
achieving compliance to operate within our current NAS framework, there lies a 
fundamental question as to how the aircraft should be controlled and who should do so. 
The selection of well-suited pilots linked to adequate designs of UAS control stations is 
paramount to the safe integration of these cutting edge systems. 
The wide-range of potential for UAS operations is already foreseen, but how 
these operations are conducted is left to future research. It is currently required that 
humans remain active in UAS operations. This is necessary for a variety of reasons, 
including re-tasking the mission, communicating with other aircraft and ATC, and to file 
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flight plans. The reasons may vary from system to system, but determining who will pilot 
the UAS is one of the biggest issues in future UAS development (Pederson et al., 2006). 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Architecture 
A system ultimately behaves in the way in which it was designed, rather than how 
it was expected or intended. This is critical to the system design where the operations 
take place in a complex, ever-changing operating environment (Williams, 2008). 
Systems are designed based on an understanding of the structure, function, and dynamics 
of the intended operating environment, as well as any foreseen variability that takes place 
within that environment. Since automated systems are literal minded agents, any 
inaccuracies, misconceptions, or simplifications in the design will inevitably lead to 
undesirable results (Hughes, 2008; Batkiewicz et al., 2006). For this reason it is 
imperative that the users remain a central focus in the design process, especially 
regarding situations where the pilot must recognize and mitigate unintended automation 
complications before they result in a catastrophe. 
Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS) 
UAS operations must meet or exceed an "equivalent level of safety" (ELOS) as 
its manned counterpart (FAA Order 7610.4k, 2004). Currently, a military review 
indicated that UAS mishaps are nearly double the magnitude of manned-aircraft 
(Williams, 2004). Up to 69% of these occurrences are due to human factors related 
issues, often resulting from poor human systems integration. A thorough review of these 
mishaps suggested that attention factors were of primary cause. (Tvaryanas, Thompson, 
& Constable, 2006). The Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (AFSAB) blames pilot 
inadequacies on the human/system interface design as a limiting factor in UAS safety and 
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control (Worch, Borky, Gabriel, Heiser, Swalm, & Wong, 1996). A major challenge is to 
discover a human interface design that adequately keeps the pilot actively involved and 
fully aware of the flight operations taking place (Walter, Knutzon, Sannier, Oliver, 2004). 
A Regulatory Assessment 
The current national airspace system is comprised of an enormous multitude of 
regulations, procedures, and operational requirements that the pilot must adhere to. This 
framework enables the ability of safe operation among the people that share the NAS, 
and also protects lives and property on the ground. The Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) has recognized the importance of UAS technology and is adamantly concerned 
with its safe implementation, especially on behalf of the pilot's new role. As a result, the 
FAA is faced with an unprecedented dilemma: the massive architecture of governance 
was built around the assumption that the human operator would reside inside of the 
aircraft; with the onset of UAS technologies, this is no longer the case. As the human 
operator gets removed from the aircraft, there are numerous complications that arise and 
the FAA is seeking ways to deal with these issues. Fulfilling the following Federal 
Aviation Regulations (FARs) are deemed to be largest barriers in the transition from 
manned to unmanned flight: 
• 19 CFR 91.3 (a) Responsibility and authority of the pilot in command 
The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final 
authority as to, the operation of that aircraft. 
• 19 CFR 91.111 (a) Operating near other aircraft 
No person may operate an aircraft so close to another aircraft as to create a 
collision hazard. 
• 19 CFR 91.113 (b) Right-of-way rules: Except water operations 
When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is 
conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be 
maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other 
aircraft. When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the 
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pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it 
unless well clear. 
(Reynolds 2008; Hottman, Hanson, & Berry, 2008) 
UAS operations will need to conform to the rules, regulations, standards and 
expectations of the future NAS (DeGarmo & Maroney, 2008). In meeting this objective, 
Hottman and Sortland (2006) highlight the importance of establishing a system that caters 
to the pilot whom insures that these ELOS objectives are met, even during unintended 
circumstances. The pilot must be able to create an accurate assessment of the flight 
situation, without being overworked. The user-interface, inclusive of the automation 
strategies, plays an important role to insure that this happens. 
There are a number of research efforts underway to address the regulatory 
challenges associated with the integration of UAS into the NAS. Well-respected 
regulating authorities such as the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), 
the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), Society of Automotive 
Engineers (SAE), National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Access 5, 
and the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EROCAE) have all 
participated in defining recommendations for the minimum requirements of UAS 
components and operations (DeGarmo & Maroney, 2008; Tvaryanas et al., 2006). As 
these standards, regulations, and constraints for UAS operations are being developed, 
regulating bodies are limited by the lack of research focusing on the most critical part of 
the system - the human component (Tvaryanas et al., 2006). 
A Technological Assessment 
To date, there are no FAA-certified UASs operating in the NAS. Research is 
currently being conducted to develop adequate systems, but there seems to be a stand-off 
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between the FAA and the industry. "The FAA wants technology answers before writing 
new regulations; operators and manufacturers want to know the regulatory landscape 
before committing to major new investments in technology" (Wilson, 2007). Developing 
a system that is capable of performing equivalent to that of a human is no small feat. 
Currently, Certificates of Authorizations (COA) and/or experimental certificates 
can be obtained by public (state-owned/operated) and civil (typically industrial and 
manufacturers) entities on a case-by-case basis when special provisions are met (AIR-
160, 2008). Commercial operations are strictly prohibited, and it may be years before 
they are granted access to operating within the NAS (DeGarmo & Maroney, 2008).These 
certificates are essentially waivers that allow for an approved UAS to operate within the 
NAS under special restrictions and accommodations. To date, a very limited number of 
COAs have been granted to UASs. These allow for new technologies to be tested, but 
certain provisions must be made to accommodate for undeveloped technologies. 
Perhaps the biggest technological barrier for commercial UAS operations is the 
ability to replace the "see-and-avoid" (SAA) tasks that are required by pilots of manned 
aircraft. There have been exceptional improvements on detect, sense, and avoid (DSA) 
systems, but none have been certified for use. It is understood that this type of system 
must be highly autonomous (very little human involvement) to fully autonomous (i.e. in 
case of communication failure). To date, only portions of an adequate sense-and-avoid 
system exist, and much of it is economically impractical, along with size, weight, and 
power (SWAP) restrictions (Wilson, 2007). 
Hunn (2006) suggests that user interface displays have the potential to enhance 
the pilot's ability to gather system information and become compatible with the system. 
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Innovative information cues and presentation options may help UAS pilots compensate 
for certain "missing" information and maintain a degree of situational awareness 
equivalent to or better than that of manned flight (SC-203,2007; Pederson et al , 2006). 
Therefore, it may be a more practical approach to evaluate the combination of the 
pilot/user-interface compatibility, rather than evaluating the performance characteristics 
of each entity on a separate basis. 
A Human Factors Assessment 
Wiener and Curry (1980) pioneered the term "clumsy automation" when they 
discovered adverse effects that had occurred due to the implementation of automation. In 
some cases, operator workload was exacerbated in response to automation; meaning 
workload was increased in times of already high workload, but decreased in times of 
already low workload (Metzger & Parasuraman, 2005). An example of this is when the 
auto-pilot feature on an aircraft reduces the workload on pilots during cruise flight where 
workload is typically low, but increases the workload on pilots during the landing portion 
of flight where workload is typically high. These findings, in conjunction with an 
abundance of faulty automation applications, were an initial step in the discovery of 
several automation-induced problems. 
It is highly agreed upon that automation has the potential to substantially change 
the way that humans perceive the situation and provide feedback in ways that were never 
intended by the system designers. (Bainbridge, 1983; Billings, 1997; Parasuraman & 
Riley, 1997; Sarter & Amalberti, 2000; Wiener & Curry, 1980). The complexity of 
automated systems have also raised concerns on operator workload, monitoring skills, 
proficiency, target detection, complex decision making, and situation awareness 
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degradation (Endsley, 1996; Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993; Wiener, 1988; Wiener 
& Curry, 1980; Galster, Bolia, Roe, & Parasuraman, 2001; Rovira, McGarry, & 
Parasuraman, 2002; Wickens & Hollands, 2000). This will ultimately alter human 
vigilance decrements, detection capabilities, limited system flexibility, and automation 
biases (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). Additionally, automated systems 
induce an effect known as automation-induced complacency, where the operator becomes 
out-of-touch with the system operation, resulting in degraded performance (Farrell & 
Lewandowsky, 2000; Parasuraman & Byrne, 2003; Parasuraman et al., 1993). These 
automation-induced complications are of high concern in the realm of UAS where the 
flying platform is said to be partially to fully- autonomous, in addition to the pilot being 
physically separated from the aircraft. Not only does this pose many safety concerns, it 
also limits the human pilot's ability to work as a fail-safe. 
McCarley and Wickens (2004) analyzed a primary consequence that occurs by 
separating the pilot from the aircraft. Rather than directly obtaining sensory input from 
the surrounding environment, pilots are limited by the amount of information portrayed 
to them by the user-interface. This information ranges from ambient visual information to 
vestibular input and sound. The result of being restricted from this sensory input is 
termed "sensory isolation". Similarly, there is also a problem referred to as out-of-the-
loop unfamiliarity (OOTLUF) (Wickens, 1992). Humans typically construct a poor 
mental model of the situation and develop insufficient SA when they are not actively 
involved in the system operations (Endsley, 1996; Endsley & Kiris, 1995). A "mental 
model" is deemed as the ability to create an accurate mental representation of something, 
such as a remote operating environment, based on one's own past experiences (Moray, 
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1997). Furthermore, laboratory findings have suggested that humans are poor monitors 
over systems, and do not play a good role as a fail-safe in highly automated systems 
(Parasuraman et al, 1993; Pope & Bogart, 1992). Early UAS designs reinforced this 
notion after they realized that pilots lacked adequate SA and did not have the capacity to 
override automated functions when necessary (Department of Defense, 2003). Studies 
performed on USAF and Army pilots indicated high levels of boredom, degraded target 
detection, decreased recognition performance, and increased reaction times (Thompson et 
al., 2006; Barnes & Matz, 1998). Conclusively, if the user-interface does not adequately 
coincide with the human operator, and vice-versa, than the overall system performance is 
degraded (Lorenz, Di Nocera, Rottger, & Parasuraman 2002). 
In order for the pilot to make timely and effective decisions, he/she must be able 
to gain an accurate assessment of the unmanned aircraft in its operating environment. In 
order for this to exist, the machine and human should interact dynamically as a single 
system (Putzer & Onken, 2001). Furthermore, Schulte (2002) argues that the operator 
should also have static background knowledge relevant to the application domain, as well 
as dynamic solution knowledge generated as an output of the cognitive sub-processes. 
The resulting decision made by the operator will be based on their prior knowledge 
applied to the interpretation of the information forwarded by the user interface. 
The increasing reliance on automation in the realm of aviation results in an 
increase in challenges to design safe, reliable, and effective automated systems. It is all 
too common for functions that were traditionally performed by a human entity to be 
replaced by fickle automated systems that have failed in highly dynamic and often 
unpredictable environments. In an attempt to transcend from historic mistakes in 
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automation, research has indicated that a more favorable approach is to develop systems 
that allow for better coordination between human and automation to allow for adequate 
human oversight (Hughes, 2008). The pilot in command (PIC) assumes sole 
responsibility for the operation of the UAS, and is a fundamental part of the system, but 
how the user-interface compliments his/her function will ultimately determine the success 
of UAS. 
UAS Pilot Selection 
The selection of UAS pilots is one area that remains to be investigated (Nelson & 
Bolia, 2006). Several military branches are selecting experienced pilots to perform these 
duties, but many wonder if this is the correct approach. Hottman & Sortland (2006) 
suggest that the KSAs of UAS pilot candidates need to be determined empirically. They 
also suggest that the KSAs required for UAS pilots not only differ significantly from 
manned flight, but also between the various UASs, taking into account the level of 
automation that is necessary to fly the unmanned aircraft. 
Tirre (1998) acknowledges that research for UAS pilots should address the 
following areas of concern: 1) the selection and training of UAS pilots to accommodate 
the necessary situation awareness tasks, and 2) the effects of UAS automation on 
potential pilots. Situation awareness is especially critical, and can be improved by 
particular interfaces but individual differences among pilots with varying KSAs still 
remains an important issue (Gawron, 1997). 
Pilot Skill Sets 
Pilots of manned-aircraft perform their job function from an egocentric 
standpoint. In other words, they reside within the operating environment. Due to their 
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location of operation, pilots are generally able to obtain sensory information directly from 
the surrounding area. This is inclusive of sounds and kinesthetic clues that help determine 
flight characteristics such as airspeed, flight attitude, and power settings. An important 
aspect of manned flight is the ability to use vision as a primary means of obtaining 
situation awareness and performing collision avoidance functions. Direct human sensing 
is a key element found in manned-flight and is an important function in safely achieving 
the desired objective of safe flight (SC-203, 2007). Consequently, the slogan "flying by 
the seat of your pants" refers to a pilot's ability to perform flight functions primarily on 
the sensory cues obtained from the surrounding environment. When a sensory cue 
changes unexpectedly, an alert pilot will further assess the situation and take preventive 
measures to mitigate risk. 
A common phrase used in the aviation community typically sums up the duties of 
a pilot: "Aviate, Navigate, Communicate " (Machado, n.d.). Aviate refers to the 
responsibility of controlling the airplane safely using the controls available (i.e. flight 
instruments, flight controls, etc.). Navigate refers to the obligation of monitoring where 
the aircraft is located and determining how to get it to where it needs to be. Communicate 
refers to the task of keeping other pilots and ATC informed of the status. For obvious 
reasons, aviate remains the top priority for the pilot, followed by navigate, and then 
communicate. (Note: In a highly automated UAS setting, these pilot functions tend to be 
in reverse order, as automation accommodates much of the aviate and navigate roles.) 
Air Traffic Control Skill Sets 
Air Traffic Controllers (ATC) performs their job function from an exocentric 
standpoint. This means that they manage airspace operations outside the range of their 
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immediate senses (Hunn, 2005). They monitor the airspace to safely conduct the flow of 
traffic and prevent collisions and hazardous situations. The job function requires that they 
quickly assess the situation by absorbing the data given to them through radar displays 
and communicating with pilots. They control several aircraft at once while visualizing 
the position of each aircraft, in time and space, in order to develop strategic decisions 
regarding heading, airspeed, and altitude. 
An in-depth KSA profile has been developed in an effort to determine ability 
requirements for air traffic controllers (EiBfeldt, & Heintz, 2002). The main categories 
are divided up into five segments: cognitive abilities, psychomotor abilities, sensory 
abilities, interactive/social abilities, knowledge/skills. Multiple abilities are evaluated 
under each category, totaling 81 different abilities in all. The core cognitive abilities of 
controllers are 'Time Sharing', 'Selective Attention', 'Visualization', and 'Speed of 
Closure'. These allow the controller to quickly and routinely organize different pieces of 
information into a meaningful pattern, while also having the ability to shift between tasks 
as appropriate. The top abilities in the psychomotor category are 'Control Precision', 
'Response Orientation', 'Rate Control', and 'Reaction Time'. These all relate to the 
speed and coordination required to operate the necessary control and communications 
equipment. The top abilities in the sensory category are 'Near Vision', 'Hearing 
Sensitivity', 'Auditory Attention', 'Speech Recognition', and 'Speech Clarity'. These 
abilities are necessary to monitor the radar control equipment while communicating with 
other controllers or pilots. Under the knowledge category, 'Map Reading', and 'Spelling' 
are seen as important factors in conducting job duties. 
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It is important to note that the required abilities differ among various ATC 
positions and systems being used. Newer systems tend to require significant increases in 
abilities related to computer usage (EiBfeldt, & Heintz, 2002). 
UAS Pilot in Command 
There is little resistance to implement the pilot into the unmanned aircraft system 
architecture, but there still remains a high level of speculation and debate as to the role 
the pilot should perform and how the technology should support their mission (Hughes, 
2008). The selection of these pilots will remain an important aspect of maintaining a 
highly dynamic system design. The range in performance characteristics of unmanned 
aircraft is vast, and the skill-set required for UAS pilot recruitment may be equally 
varied. 
A UAS pilot will and always will be a necessary component of the system 
(Pederson et al., 2006), however, the required KSAs that an unmanned aircraft pilot 
should posses have yet to be determined (Pederson et al., 2006). Increases in UAS 
automation is decreasing the necessity for traditional pilot skills (DeGarmo & Maroney, 
2008), and instead requiring a heightened need for monitoring and collaborative decision 
making skills. An alternative approach is to consider the expertise of an air traffic 
controller, especially due to the similarity of multitasking and familiarity of 
exocentrically controlling a variety of air vehicles differing in space and timing (Hunn, 
2005). 
Schulte (2002) suggests that the reason for many of the negative impacts created 
by automation can be due to inconsistencies between the automated machine functions 
and how the pilot perceives them (Schulte, 2002). This reasoning implies that there will 
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be differences in system perception and operation, based on an individual's background; 
hence the differences in formal training among pilots and air traffic controllers having an 
impact on their perception and decision making ability. Likewise, the overall system 
design must be able to work in concert with the operator in which it is paired with. The 
superior design of the overall system, inclusive of the operator, is directly correlated to 
the pinnacle of its success. 
Automation 
Automation is a very complex and highly debatable topic in the research and 
engineering fields. Sheridan (2002) defines automation as "(a) the mechanization and 
integration of sensing the environmental variables (by artificial sensors); (b) data 
processing and decision making (by computers); and (c) mechanical action (by motors 
and devices that apply forces on the environment) or information action' by 
communication of processed information to people". More simply, Parasuraman and 
Riley (1997) define automation as "the execution by a machine agent (e.g. computer) of a 
function previously carried out by a human operator." Automation by design only does 
what it has been told to do, rather than what is expected, intended, or desired (Hughes, 
2008). It is for this reason that a human-operator, who inhibits the ability to foresee the 
unexpected and take corrective action to mitigate unintended situations, is an essential 
part of the system design. In an ever-changing aerospace environment, the automated part 
of the system is more vulnerable to unforeseen situations. 
With an ideally designed automated system, there has shown to be improvements 
to the operators SA, cognitive ability, and perceptual grounds for decision-making 
(Wiener, 1988). Studies specific to UAS have even suggested that there is a reduction of 
24 
The Effect of Learned 25 
operator workload with increased automation (Dixon, Wickens, & Chang, 2003). 
Automated systems have also played a significant role in improving the perceptual and 
cognitive abilities of the flight crew, while providing comfort to passengers, as well as 
increasing fuel efficiency and reducing flight times (Wiener, 1988). 
There are several applications that are currently being used in the modern-day 
NAS that assist the pilot with tasks that were once difficult and perhaps infeasible. 
Automated technologies used throughout the aviation arena range from Flight 
Management Systems (FMS) to Automatic Dependent, Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) 
systems. Automation assists the pilot in number of tasks including the detection of other 
flight traffic, engine and fuel monitoring, and even flying the airplane. In fact, automated 
technologies allow some modern jet aircraft ranging from the Boeing 747 to the F-l 17 
Stealth Fighter to complete an entire flight with very little pilot interaction. 
The automated machine offers several advantages over a human operator, but the 
operator also has advantages over the machine. For instance, machines can carry out 
complex calculation quickly and precisely. Unlike humans, automated machinery rarely 
falters, and does not become tired, distracted, or bored. Humans on the other hand, are 
capable of planning, overseeing, and making intelligent decisions in time of uncertainty 
or automation failure. If they work together effectively, then they can achieve superior 
goals greater than the sum of the individual parts. However, this is not always the case. 
Hughes (2008) warns us that automation is not a panacea under conditions of uncertain 
changing situations. History has indicated that automated systems fail to perform as they 
were intended. He furthers this notion by identify three points that are inherent to 
systems: 
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• All cognitive systems are finite (people, machines, or combinations) 
• All finite cognitive systems in uncertain changing situation are fallible. 
• Therefore, machine cognitive systems (and joint systems across people 
and machines) are fallible 
(Hughes, 2008) 
It is clear that systems are inevitably fallible, especially in the highly dynamic and often 
unpredictable environments that UASs plan to operate within. Even if the probability of 
system fallibility is low, the magnitude of an adverse consequence often remains high. 
This is why it is so critical to design a system that allows for a pilot with the right skill-
sets to be actively involved in the system operation. 
Human-Centered A utomation 
Unlike conventional automation techniques, human-centered automation focuses 
on distributing tasks among the human and machine so that a team effort is achieved 
(Endsley, 1996; Billings, 1997). Human-centered automation is a technique that allows 
the human to function effectively as part of system, rather than simply an add-on to an 
already existing system. Information gathered and forwarded by the automated system is 
critical to the pilot's ability to quickly and accurately assess the situation that the 
unmanned aircraft is encountering. A poorly designed system can leave the pilot with 
only bits and pieces of information, which can result in poor SA and cognitive under-
load, thereby resulting in overall poor performance (Sanders & McCormick, 1993). 
Therefore, humans must know how to operate the automated system, and the system must 
be designed in a way that reinforces an actively informed pilot. For this to happen the 
human operator must be fed correct information in the right amount of time and in the 
right manner. In the case of UAS operations, there is little room for error or inaccuracies 
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to take place. C.E. Billings (1997) identifies several key principles that make up human-
centered automation in a modern aviation context. They are as follows: 
Premises: 
• The pilot bears the responsibility for safety of flight. 
• Controllers bear the responsibility for traffic separation and safe traffic 
flow. 
Axioms: 
• Pilots must remain in command of their flight. 
• Controllers must remain in command of air traffic. 
Corollaries: 
• The pilots and controller must be actively involved. 
• Both human operators must be adequately informed. 
• The operators must be able to monitor the automation assisting them. 
• The automated systems must therefore be predictable. 
• The automated systems must also monitor the human operator. 
• Every intelligent system element must know the intent of other intelligent 
system elements. 
(Billings, 1997) 
The benefits of automation are ultimately contingent on how automation strategies are 
applied and distributed among the machine and the pilot. Appropriate allocation of 
system functions is essential to overall system performance. 
Function Allocation 
Sheridan (1998) defined function allocation as "the assignment of required 
functions (tasks) to resources, instruments, or agents (either people or machines)". For 
years, human factors experts have been trying to identify ways in which to best distribute 
tasks between human and machines. Hughes (2008) argues that designers should develop 
systems that provide for effective coordination between the user and the machine, rather 
than separate tasks between the two. This is effectively known as "team play". Richard 
Pew (1998) relates this concept to that of a symphony, whereby the composer aims at 
acquiring a harmonious sound by assigning individual instrument parts that work in 
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concert with each other. Likewise, certain tasks should be appropriately divided up 
between the human and the machine in a way that will safely and effectively achieve the 
overall objectives. 
The process of applying automation can be a difficult task in discerning which 
functions should be automated and what functions should be left up to the human. 
Schulte (2002) provided us with a high-level example of the strengths of humans and that 
of machines, as well as how they collaborate: 
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Figure 6. Synergetic resources for man-machine cooperation (Schulte 2002) 
Sanders & McCormick (1993) point out that humans are typically better at 
sensing unusual situations in the environment, deriving alternative solutions, and the 
detection of unexpected stimuli. Whereas machines are excellent at conducting pre-
specified tasks, endure extreme environmental elements, and reliably repeat their pre-
assigned functions. It should be noted that along with the inevitable progression of 
technology, the capabilities of machine will also evolve, resulting in the possibility of 
current human strengths being overcome by that of a machine. 
Many conventional systems do not provide for an adequate level of human 
involvement within the system operation, thereby placing the entire system at a much 
higher risk for failure. It is also common for system designers to only focus on decreasing 
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workload but this often results in a decrease in situation awareness, thereby increasing 
risk for failure. Due in large part to this concept, a U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory 
Board concluded that the allocation of functions, and human-machine interface designs 
are both major shortfalls in UAS operations (Worch, 1996). An ideal system should be 
designed in a way that decreases workload, while increasing SA. Since one is often 
gained at the sacrifice of another, both should be measured in unison to discover the best 
desired combination of the two. 
Studies of Automation on Workload 
Workload is a general term used to describe the cost of accomplishing task 
requirements for the human element of a man-machine system (Hart & Wickens, 1990). 
Essentially, this comes down to a supply-and-demand type of concept. As a task 
becomes more demanding, the human must expend a higher amount of workload to 
compensate. Although humans are typically agile creatures by nature, there comes a point 
where demands exceed the amount of workload available, resulting in diminished 
performance (Sarno & Wickens, 1995). It is suggested that workload can be measured by 
numerous factors including: physical demand, mental demand, time pressure, effort 
expended, performance level achieved, frustration experienced, and annoyance 
experienced (Spirkovska, 2006). 
Performance can be degraded as a result of both high and low levels of workload 
demands (Crescenzio, Miranda, Periani, Bombardi, 2007). Low levels of automation 
typically demand higher levels of operator workload, whereas high levels of automation 
demand lower levels of operator workload but inevitably result in decreased SA, or out-
of-the-loop performance decrements. Out-of-the-loop performance decrements require 
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the operator to expend an abundant amount of workload in a short amount of time to 
regain in-the-loop familiarity with the situation. Crescenzio suggests that an ideal human-
centered interface should provide the human with the following: 
• Low level of operator workload: the operator would have to spend few 
resources in terms of time and cognitive effort to command the 
vehicle, in order to manage the mission and analyses the information 
coming from onboard system. 
• High level of operator situation awareness: the operator should be 
provided with a comprehensive view of the overall mission scenario, 
in order to understand the mission state and detailed vehicle state 
during the mission, enabling him to score and order all the information 
to develop the optimal command sequence 
(Crescenzio et al., 2007) 
It is noteworthy to mention that just as supply and demand continually fluctuate in the 
real business market, so does that of workload and SA. Therefore, it can be suggested 
that there will be a point of equilibrium where workload supply and SA demands will 
result in best achievable performance; yet fluctuations can be expected through time due 
to constant changes in factors such as operator characteristics and environmental 
concerns. 
Alleviating pilot workload, while maintaining (or increasing) adequate S A should 
be of primary importance in the design of a UAS. A disengaged pilot often results in out-
of-the-control-loop performance decrements, deficits in SA, sporadic workload, and 
inability to regain system control (Kaber & Endsley, 1997). 
Studies of Automation on Situation Awareness 
Endsley (1988) formally defines SA as "the perception of the elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and 
the projection of their status in the future." Endsley (1995) later classifies SA into three 
levels to better apply towards complex systems. Level 1 requires the pilot to perceive 
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relevant environmental information (e.g. the presence of another aircraft). Level 2 
requires the pilot to comprehend the lower level situation to predict how it will affect the 
current situation (e.g. the aircraft is in conflict with current flight path). Level 3 requires 
the pilot comprehends the lower levels to predict future outcomes (e.g. a collision with 
the aircraft will occur unless a heading adjustment is made). 
In the event that systems are highly automated, achieving a state of Level 3 SA is 
very difficult to accomplish. Even achieving Level 2 SA has shown to be problematic 
(Carmody & Gluckman, 1993; Endsley & Kiris, 1995). Endsley (1997) summarizes these 
problems as: 
• Vigilance decrements associated with monitoring, complacency due to 
over-reliance on automation, or a lack of trust in automation can all 
significantly reduce SA as people may neglect monitoring tasks, 
attempt to monitor but do so poorly, or be aware of indicated 
problems, but neglect them due to high false alarm rates. 
• Passive processing of information under automation (as opposed to 
active manual processing) can make the dynamic update and 
integration of system information more difficult. 
• Changes in form or a complete loss of feedback frequently occur either 
intentionally or inadvertently with many automated systems. 
• Failure to achieve desired reductions in operator workload as 
monitoring is a demanding task and the automation itself introduces 
new kinds of workload 
(Endsley, 1997) 
An ideal method of designing a system that allows for a cooperative human-
system synergy is accomplished by strategically determining the appropriate level of 
automation (LOA) that minimizes the impacts of SA. "LOA represents a strategy for 
improving the functioning of the overall human-machine system by integrating the 
human and automated system in a way that allows the human to function effectively as 
part of the system (Endsley, 1997)." 
Levels of Automation 
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Levels of automation is defined as "the level of task planning and performance 
interaction maintained between the human operator and computer in controlling a 
complex system (Kaber & Endsley, 2003)." The level in which the machine and/or 
human are involved in the particular function is deemed to be the level of automation that 
is implemented into the design. 
Endsley & Kaber (1999) point out that automation is not an all or nothing 
concept. Instead, it can be applied to a multitude of tasks in various ways. Sheridan and 
Verplank (1978) discovered this concept early on while establishing automation 
techniques for teleoperated undersea vessels. The objective was not to assign individual 
tasks between the human and the machine, but to establish a 'game-plan' for a variety of 
tasks in a way that kept both assets actively involved. This coordination technique kept 
the human in the loop, while allowing for 'team-play' to be carried out. Table 1 lists the 
various levels of automation that could be associated with each task. 
Table 1 
Sheridan & Verplank's Level of Automation. (Sheridan & Verplank, 1978) 
(1) Human does the whole job up to the point of turning it over to the computer to implement 
(2) Computer helps by determining the options 
(3) Computer helps to determine options and suggests one, which human need not follow 
(4) Computer selects action and human may or may not do it 
(5) Computer selects action and implements it if human approves 
(6) Computer selects action, informs human in plenty of time to stop it 
(7) Computer does whole job and necessarily tells human what it did 
(8) Computer does whole job and tells human what it did only if human explicitly asks 
(9) Computer does whole job and decides what the human should be told 
(lO)Computer does the whole job if it decides it should be done and, if so, tells human, if it 
decides that the human should be told. 
Nearly ten years later, Endsley (1987) developed a similar model that focused on 
the human component of the system, rather than the machine. Endsley also added levels 
that would accommodate for fully-autonomous and fully-manual system functions. Table 
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2 provides a conceptual framework as to the level in which the human is involved in the 
task. 
Table 2 
Endsley's Level of Automation. (Endsley, 1987) 
(1) Manual Control- no assistance from system 
(2) Decision Support- by the operator with input in the form of recommendations provided by the system 
(3) Consensual Artificial Intelligence- by the system with the consent of the operator required to carry 
out actions 
(4) Monitored Artificial Intelligence- by the system to be automatically implanted unless vetoed by the 
operator 
(5) Full Automation- no operator interaction 
Endsley and Kaber (1997, 1999) further expanded this concept to include a wi'der 
range of cognitive and psychomotor skills necessary to complete tasks in cooperation 
with a machine counterpart. The applicability of the updated concept applies to many 
various domains that shared a variety of commonalities including: "(1) multiple 
competing goals, (2) multiple tasks competing for an operator's attention, each with 
difference goals, (3) high task demands under limited time resources (Kaber & Endsley, 
2003)." Likewise, there were also four intrinsic functions or 'roles' discovered for each 
level of automation: 
1. Monitoring- which includes taking in all information relevant to perceiving 
system status (e.g. scanning visual displays) 
2. Generating-formulating options or task strategies for achieving goals; 
3. Selecting-deciding on a particular option or strategy 
4. Implementing-carrying out the chosen option through control actions at an 
interface 
(Kaber & Endsley, 2003) 
Ensley's level of automation taxonomy is displayed in Table 3. A detailed explanation of 
each LOA is defined in Figure 8. 
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Table 3 
Endsley's LOA Taxonomy. (Kaber & Endsley, 2003) 
Level of Automation 
(1) Manual Control 
(2) Action Support 
(3) Batch Processing 
(4) Shared Control 
(5) Decision Support 
(6) Blended Decision making 
(7) Rigid System 
(8) Automated Decision 
Making 
(9) Supervisory Control 
(10) Full Automation 
Roles 
Monitoring 
Human 
Human/Computer 
Human/Computer 
Human/Computer 
Human/Computer 
Human/Computer 
Human/Computer 
Human/Computer 
Human/Computer 
Computer 
Generating 
Human 
Human 
Human 
Human/Computer 
Human/Computer 
Human/Computer 
Computer 
Human/Computer 
Computer 
Computer 
Selecting 
Human 
Human 
Human 
Human 
Human 
Human/Computer 
Human 
Computer 
Computer 
Computer 
Implementing 
Human 
Human/Computer 
Computer 
Human/Computer 
Computer 
Computer 
Computer 
Computer 
Computer 
Computer 
(1) Manual— The human performs all tasks including monitoring the state of the system, 
generating performance options, selecting the option to perform (decision making) and 
physically implementing it. 
(2) Action support— At this level, the system assists the operator with performance of 
the selected action, although some human control actions are required. A teleoperation 
system involving manipulator slaving based on human master input is a common 
example. 
(3) Batch processing— Although the human generates and selects the options to be 
performed, they then are turned over to the system to be carried out automatically. The 
automation is, therefore, primarily in terms of physical implementation of tasks. Many 
systems, which operate at this fairly low level of automation, exist, such as batch 
processing systems in manufacturing operations or cruise control on a car. 
(4) Shared control— Both the human and the computer generate possible decision 
options. The human still retains full control over the selection of which option to 
implement, however, carrying out the actions is shared between the human and the 
system. 
(5) Decision support— The computer generates a list of decision options, which the 
human can select from, or the operator may generate his or her own options. Once the 
human has selected an option, it is turned over to the computer to implement. This level 
is representative of many expert systems or decision support systems that provide option 
guidance, which the human operator may use or ignore in performing a task. This level is 
indicative of a decision support system that is capable of also carrying out tasks, while 
the previous level (shared control) is indicative of one that is not. 
6) Blended decision making— At this level, the computer generates a list of decision 
options, which it selects from and carries out if the human consents. The human may 
approve of the computer's selected option or select one from among those generated by 
the computer or the operator. The computer will then carry out the selected action. This 
level represents a high-level decision support system that is capable of selecting among 
alternatives as well as implementing the selected option. 
(7) Rigid system— This level is representative of a system that presents only a limited 
set of actions to the operator. The operator's role is to select from among this set. He or 
she cannot generate any other options. This system is, therefore, fairly rigid in allowing 
the operator little discretion over options. It will fully implement the selected actions, 
however. 
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(8) Automated decision making— At this level, the system selects the best option to 
implement and carries out that action, based upon a list of alternatives it generates 
(augmented by alternatives suggested by the human operator). This system, therefore, 
automates decision making in addition to the generation of options (as with decision 
support systems). 
(9) Supervisory control— At this level, the system generates options, selects the option 
to implement and carries out that action. The human mainly monitors the system and 
intervenes if necessary. Intervention places the human in the role of making a different 
option selection (from those generated by the computer or one generated by the operator); 
thus, effectively shifting to the Decision Support LOA. This level is representative of a 
typical supervisory control system in which human monitoring and intervention, when 
needed, is expected in conjunction with a highly automated system. 
(10) Full automation— At this level, the system carries out all actions. The human is 
completely out of the control loop and cannot intervene. This level is representative of a 
fully automated system where human processing is not deemed necessary. 
Figure 7. LOA Taxonomy Definitions (Kaber & Endsley, 2003) 
Billings (1997), offers a similar approach to automation styles directly related to 
pilot and ATC operations. Among those are two levels of automation that are approached 
prior to reaching a fully autonomous state of operation: management by consent and 
management by exception. 
Management by Consent 
MBC is a management style that incorporates lower levels of automation. This 
management style allows the machine to perform functions only when given permission 
by the operator, and correlates with levels 6 and 7 of Kaber & Endsley's (2003) level of 
automation taxonomies. This style of automation associates the pilot as a team player in 
the system functions, since he/she must designate the tasks to be conducted by 
automation. This often results in higher SA but also increases workload. 
It has been demonstrated that airline pilots prefer the MBC approach over MBE 
(Olson & Salter, 1998), due to their ability to control system functions. However, pilot 
preference shifted to MBE in situations involving high workload, task complexity, and 
situations resulting in heightened time pressure. 
Management by Exception 
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MBE is the management style that incorporates higher levels of automation. 
According to Billings (1996) management by exception is "a management-control 
situation in which the automation possesses the capability to perform all actions required 
for mission completion and performs them unless the manager takes exception". 
Essentially, this management style incorporates the use of levels 8 and 9 on Kaber & 
Endsley's (2003) level of automation taxonomies. This allows for the machine to initiate 
and perform functions on its own, and requires little pilot interaction (Billings, 1997); yet, 
the pilot still has the opportunity to become involved in system operations when chosen, 
or re-delegate tasks to automation when necessary. 
MBE reduces the amount of pilot involvement and increases the risk of losing 
track of system functions. This management style also requires the pilot to perform a 
monitoring role, often resulting in automation surprises such as degraded SA and 
sporadic cognitive workload (Sarter, Woods, Billings, 1997). Automation problems are 
believed to be further exacerbated in systems that do not actively support operators in the 
monitoring role (Olson & Sarter, 2000). 
The benefits of automation, especially on a grand scale, is likely indicative on the 
level of automation that is implemented (Mouloua, Gilson, Daskarolis-Kring, Kring, 
Hancock 2001; Parasuraman, et al., 2000). Much research is needed to determine which 
levels of automation are optimal for UAS operations (McCarley & Wickens, 2005). 
Ruff, Calhoun, Draper, Fontejon, and Guilfoos (2004) performed a similar UAS study 
that indicated MBE resulted in higher workload and poorer performance then MBC. A 
preceding study also discovered that MBC produced a higher level of mission efficiency 
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and higher levels of SA than MBE (Ruff, Narayanan, & Draper, 2002). The known 
advantages and disadvantages of each management style are shown in Figure 8. 
Level of Automation 
Management by Consent 
(MBC) 
Management by Exception 
(MBE) 
Advantages 
• Involves human in 
action selection 
process 
• Greater Situation 
Awareness 
• Lower levels of 
operator workload 
• Shorter action 
selection times 
Disadvantages 
• Higher levels of 
Operator workload 
• Longer action 
selection times 
• Removes human 
requirement from 
action selection 
• Prompts lower 
operator awareness 
Figure 8. LOA Comparisons (Wasson, 2005) 
Summary 
The UAS control station must allow the pilot to fly the aircraft in a safe manner. Many of 
the human performance related regulations and standards related to human performance 
that exist today apply to the UAS control station but are not sufficient when the pilot is 
remote from the aircraft. A human centered control station design will mitigate human 
error and facilitate safe, easier control station training and learning. 
-RTCA SC-203, 2007 
UASs are complex highly-automated systems that intend to operate within 
expansive and rather unpredictable environments. While operating in these environments, 
they are restricted by human and technology limitations, as well as regulatory 
frameworks mandated for safe facilitation of the NAS. The unmanned aircraft component 
of the system must demonstrate an equivalent level of safety to that of manned aircraft. 
The pilot must be able to monitor and assess the state of the unmanned aircraft, the 
unmanned aircraft operating environment, as well as monitoring the control station 
environment. As a result, heightened cognitive demands that drastically alter mental 
workload and SA should be expected. A faulty human-control interface design can 
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present grave danger to other NAS users if not properly engaged. Unfortunately, 
performance testing in this critical area is extremely rare and time is growing short. 
There currently lacks a certifiable UAS design that has been granted access into 
the NAS by the FAA. Adequate standards and guidance material is currently being 
developed to help facilitate a safe and effective implementation of this aspiring 
technology. Though certification expectations for technology have yet to be identified, 
one thing remains certain: the pilot remains to be the sole responsibility of the aircraft. A 
new and refreshing design approach would be to use the human as a starting point, and 
design the automated machine as an extension of the pilot. 
A main area of concern is to discover an ideal combination of KSAs in 
conjunction with automation strategies. It is pertinent that the pilot be delivered the right 
information, at the right time, and in the right manner. It is also important for the pilot to 
perceive that information correctly, make decisions based on sound rationale, and provide 
correct feedback. In the event that a lower level of autonomy is used, the pilot must be 
able to safely keep up with the cognitive workload while maintaining adequate S A. In the 
event that a higher level of automation is used, the pilot must still remain adequately 
involved, aware, and in-the-loop of the UAS operation. MBC and MBE automation 
strategies in conjunction with pilot and ATC expertise are all familiar attributes in the 
aviation domain. The intent of this current research is to discover a good combination 
between the management styles and individual experiences, rather than solely focusing 
on each factor individually. Therefore, both Air Traffic Controllers (with extrinsic flight 
familiarity) and pilots (with intrinsic flight familiarity) will be tested at both MBE and 
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MBC levels of automation to determine if there are any prominent combinations that 
exist. 
Statement of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Participants using MBC automation strategies will result in higher 
accuracy scores than those using MBE automation strategies. 
Hypothesis 2: Participants using MBE automation strategies will result in lower task 
processing times than those using MBC automation strategies. 
Hypothesis 3: Participants using MBE automation strategies will result in lower workload 
scores than when they are using MBC automation strategies. 
Hypothesis 4: Participants using MBC automation strategies will result in higher SA 
scores than when they are using MBE automation strategies. 
Hypothesis 5: The Pilot group will result in higher task accuracy scores than the ATC 
group and the control group. 
Hypothesis 6: The ATC group will result in lower task processing times than the Pilot 
group and the control group. 
Hypothesis 7: The ATC group will indicate lower workload scores than the Pilot group 
and the control group. 
Hypothesis 8: The Pilot group will indicate higher SA scores than the ATC group and 
the control group. 
Hypothesis 9: An interaction will exist between level of automation and user experiences 
for task processing times. Specifically, in high levels of automation, Air 
Traffic Controllers will have lower task processing times, whereas pilot 
task processing times will remain the same or increase. 
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Hypothesis 10: An interaction will exist between level of automation and user 
experiences for workload. Specifically, in high levels of automation, Air 
Traffic Controllers will indicate lower workload ratings, whereas pilot 
workload ratings will increase or remain the same. 
Hypothesis 11: An interaction will exist between level of automation and user 
experiences for situation awareness. Specifically, in high levels of 
automation, Air Traffic Controllers will indicate lower situation awareness 
ratings, whereas pilot situation awareness ratings will increase or remain 
the same. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four participants from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University were 
selected to participate in the study. All students were upper-classmen with an average age 
of 22 years. 16 students were male and 8 were female. The targeted population groups 
were inclusive of eight flight students, eight ATC students, and eight additional Human 
Factors students to represent the baseline. All participants were selected on a volunteer 
basis. Participants were asked to sign a consent form acknowledging their willingness to 
participate on a free-will basis (see Appendix A). Each volunteer was compensated $15 
for their time. An additional $100 cash prize incentive was awarded to the top performer. 
Apparatus 
The apparatus consisted of a UAS software test-bed simulation device called 
MIIIRO (Multi-modal Immersive Intelligent Interface for Remote Operations). MIIIRO 
has been widely used as an UAS research simulator (Nelson, Lefebvre, & Andre, 2004; 
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Tso et al. 2003). The software was designed by IA Tech with support from the Air Force 
Research Laboratory, and is geared towards supporting research for long-range, high-
endurance UASs. The hardware component is comprised of a standard PC with a dual 
monitor setup. The primary monitor portrayed the Tactical Situation Display (TSD) 
which encompassed the topographical image of the unmanned aircraft's environment, the 
unmanned aircraft(s), a color-coded assignment of unmanned aircraft routes, critical 
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and SA were subjective measures filled out by the participants, whereas accuracy and 
response times were objective measures collected by the MIIIRO software. Refer to table 
4 for a graphical depiction of the experimental design. 
Table 4 
Experimental Design 
Experience 
Pilot ATC Baseline 
Level of Automation 
MBE 
Tasks 
Primary Task 
The MBC and MBE flight mission scenarios were set up similar to a highly-
automated UAS. Therefore, there was no direct control of the unmanned aircrafts flight 
control surfaces. Instead, predetermined waypoints made up the flight path in which the 
unmanned aircraft autonomously followed. Along the flight path, 15 image capture 
locations were also preset and the associated images were automatically displayed to the 
participant, once the unmanned aircraft approached the preset waypoint. 
The primary task of the participant was to view the images collected by the 
unmanned aircraft and verify that the Automatic Target Recognizer (ATR) had selected 
the correct target(s) present in the image. Each image collected along the flight route 
contained at least one ground vehicle, but a threat was not always present. The threats 
and non-threats were depicted as ground vehicles and were visually discemable by color, 
but were not always selected correctly by the ATR. The ATR attempted to distinguish 
1 8 8 
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between the two or more vehicles by placing a red box around the threat(s). The 
reliability of the ATR was set to 80%, so the participant had to verify that threats were 
correctly selected. In cases where the ATR had incorrectly dissociated threats from non-
threats, the participant needed to manually select and/or deselect the images by directly 
clicking on the targets with a mouse curser. 
During MBC scenarios, the participant processed the image manually by 
accepting or rejecting each image in the image cue. During MBE scenarios, the computer 
automatically processed the images after a 15 second duration, unless the participant 
overrode the automation by manually processing the images. If the participant needed 
more time, they were instructed to press a hold button which reset the time-out period to 
15 seconds. 
Primary task performance data was collected automatically by the MIIIRO 
software. The primary dataset was inclusive of: image response time, image queue time, 
image processing time, target selection accuracy, manual accepts/rejection, automatic 
accepts/rejections and image hold times. 
Secondary Task 
There are two secondary tasks associated with the experiment. The first task 
encompassed Intruder Aircraft (IA) events that mimicked an unexpected aircraft entering 
within the unmanned aircrafts airspace. This random event occurred twice per trial, and 
was deemed a highly critical situation that necessitated a quick and attentive response. 
The event was depicted by a red aircraft-shaped icon instantly appearing on the TSD at 
random times. To alleviate the threat, the participant needed to click on the aircraft and 
enter a pre-determined code. 
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The second task encompassed a MMI that mimicked an indicator representing the 
status or health of the UAS. This indicator was constantly displayed on the TSD and 
looked similar to a horizontal traffic light. It was made up of three round lights that 
changed from green to yellow or red, depending on the unmanned aircrafts status. A 
green status indicated that the unmanned aircraft was in good health. The light would 
randomly change to yellow or red, indicating that attention was needed from the 
simulated pilot to correct the situation. To correct the situation, the participant was 
required to click on the light panel and correctly type in a text string of numbers shown in 
a pop-up window. Once the text string was entered correctly, the status indicator returned 
back to green, indicating a healthy status. 
Secondary task performance data was collected automatically by the MIIIRO 
software. The secondary dataset is inclusive of: MMI event occurrences, MMI response 
times, IA occurrences, and IA detection response times. 
Subjective Workload 
A NASA-TLX rating scale was used to measure workload experienced by the 
participants (Hart & Staveland, 1988). The NASA-TLX provided an overall workload 
score based on a weighted average and rating of six subscales: Mental Demands, Physical 
Demands, Temporal Demands, Performance, Effort, and Frustration. The participant first 
responded to a series of pair-wise comparisons to determine the ranking order in which 
each subscale topic contributed to overall workload during the task. These subscales 
were then weighted in order of its rank, with the top ranking subscale given the most 
weight. The participant then rated each workload subscale individually as to how they 
felt it pertained to the mission scenario. High ranking subscales did not always coincide 
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with highly rated subscales. For example, the participant may have ranked the Physical 
Demand subscale to be the most critical aspect effecting workload, but still rated it low 
due to it being a computer-based simulation requiring little physical demands. 
Documentation of the NASA-TLX is provided in Appendix C. 
Subjective Situation Awareness 
A modified Post-Trial Participant Subjective Situation Awareness Questionnaire 
(PSAQ) was used to measure the level of SA experienced by the participants. The PSAQ 
instrument is a questionnaire designed for the participant to rate specific levels of SA and 
also illicit their own responses following each mission scenario. Each item was rated on a 
5-point scale. A rating of 1 indicated that the participant was not aware of the evolving 
situation, whereas a rating of 5 indicated that the participant had been fully aware of the 
evolving situation (Strater, Endsley, Pleban, & Matthews, 2001). 
The PSAQ derived from Strater et al. (2001) originally measured three items: 
• Workload: how hard the participant worked during the scenario. 
• Performance—how well the officer performed during the scenario, and 
• Self-perceived SA—how aware the officer was of the evolving situation. 
These three subjective measurements were retained for the questionnaire being conducted 
in this current study. However, an additional five questions were added to assess the 
participants' SA specific to events contained within each mission scenario. This is 
inclusive of the Mission Mode Indicator status, Intruding Aircraft, and the perception of 
the aircrafts involvement within the surrounding environment. The modified PSAQ 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix D. 
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Procedure 
Upon the participant's arrival to the lab, they were asked to fill out a consent form 
(see Appendix A) and Biographical Questionnaire (see Appendix B) asking questions 
about their background. During this time, they were also introduced to the PSAQ and 
NASA-TLX questionnaires. The participants were then be familiarized with the MIIIRO 
simulator and informed of the research taking place. Each participant took part in an 
instructional session and a five-minute hands-on training exercise that familiarized them 
with all possible events that were to occur in the actual scenarios. Any questions that the 
participants had were answered at that time. 
After the participant had been briefed and were ready to proceed, they were 
instructed to begin the trial. No assistance was granted at this time. Each participant 
conducted both MBC and MBE scenarios. In an effort to counterbalance the ordering 
effect, the first scenario was randomly assigned, followed by the alternate scenario. 
Accuracy and time data were automatically collected by the MIIIRO test bed software. 
Immediately following each simulated flying mission, the participant filled out a 
workload and SA questionnaire. Once both trials were complete, and all data was 
collected, the participant was debriefed and additional questions were answered at that 
time. Each participant was paid $15 for their participation and was instructed to sign a 
payment receipt. Once the entire study was concluded, the individual with the highest 
performance score was contacted and awarded $100. 
Results 
The objective of the present study was to investigate the effects of level of 
automation and user experience on UAS piloting performance, workload, and situation 
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awareness. The achieved results have been divided into four main areas of interest: 
accuracy, task processing time, workload, and situation awareness. The data was 
analyzed using several repeated measure factorial designs to assess the effects of level of 
automation on user experience resulting in each of the following independent variables: 
image accuracy, image processing time, MMI processing time, IA processing time, 
workload, and situation awareness. 
Accuracy 
For the primary task, image accuracy refers to the number of images correctly 
accepted or rejected as being a threat or non-threat. The number of correctly processed 
images were then divided by the total number of images for each simulated mission to 
reveal an overall percentage score. Hypotheses one and five anticipated that the level of 
automation, and the experience levels of the simulated pilot would impact the task 
accuracy scores. Hypothesis one predicted that the use of MBC automation strategies 
would result in higher accuracy scores than the use of MBE automation strategies. 
Hypothesis five predicted that the Pilot group would result in higher task accuracy scores 
than the ATC group and the control group. To test these hypotheses, a repeated measures 
factorial ANOVA was conducted on the accuracy scores. 
47 
The Effect of Learned 48 
Image Accuracy 
Table 5 illustrates the ANOVA results on image accuracy. 
Table 5 
ANOVA Source Table for Target Accuracy (%) 
Source SS df MS / P Eta Squared Power 
Within Subjects 
LOA 
LOA* Experience 
Error (LOA) 
.188 
.375 
255.938 
1 .188 
2 .188 
21 12.188 
.015 
.015 
.902 
.985 
.004 
.106 
.052 
.052 
Between Subjects 
Intercept 
Experience 
Error 
437963.021 
479.042 
1928.438 
1 437963.021 
2 239.521 
21 91.830 
4769.262 
2.608 
.000 
.097 
.981 
.007 
1.000 
.462 
*p<.05. 
Image Accuracy Main Effect Interpretation: Level of Automation. The derived 
F=.015 for the level of automation main effect did not exceed the tabled critical value 
.F=4.33 at^»=.05 with df\=\ and dfi=2\. Therefore, it is concluded that the mean image 
accuracy score for MBC (M=95.458, SD=8.387) was not significantly different from the 
mean image accuracy score for MBE (M=95.583, SD=6.743), F(l,21)=.015,/?>.05. In 
terms of hypothesis one, it appears that the differences in image accuracy scores among 
the MBC and MBE groups are non-significant. 
Image Accuracy Main Effect Interpretation: Experience. The derived F=2.608 
for the experience main effect did not exceed the tabled critical value F=3.47 at/?=05 
with df\=2 and dfi=2\. Therefore, it is concluded that there are no significant differences 
among the mean image accuracy scores for the Pilot (M=97.500, SD=3.665), ATC 
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(M=91.063, SD=11.51), and control (M=98.000, SD=2.58) groups, F(l,21)=2.608, 
p>.05. In terms of hypothesis five, it appears that the differences in image accuracy 
scores among Pilot, ATC, and control groups are non-significant. 
Task Processing Time 
Task processing times are separated into three individual times pertaining to three 
different tasks. The primary task, image processing time, represents the average time it 
took the simulated pilot to recognize and process the ground-based images displayed in 
the IMD. The MMI processing time represents the average time it took the simulated 
pilot to identify and accurately respond to the multiple mission mode indicator events. 
The IA processing times indicate the average time it took the simulated pilot to identify 
an intruder aircraft and resolve the conflict using the IFF code. Hypotheses two, six, and 
nine all refer to task processing times. Hypothesis two predicted that participants using 
MBE level of automation strategies would result in lower task processing times than 
participants using MBC levels of automation. Hypothesis six predicted that the ATC 
group would have lower task processing times than the Pilot group and the control group. 
Hypothesis nine predicted that an interaction would exist between the level of automation 
and user experience for task processing times. To test these hypotheses, a repeated 
measures factorial ANOVA was conducted on each of the processing times. 
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Image Processing Time 
Table 6 illustrates the ANOVA results on image processing time. 
Table 6 
ANOVA Source Table for Image Processing Time (ms) 
Source SS df MS f p
 S q ^ e d Power 
Within Subjects 
LOA 295945 1 295945 J\5 4^81 1)24 .105 
LOA*Experience 189348 2 94674 .165 .849 .015 .072 
Error (LOA) 12061848 21 574375 
Between Subjects 
Intercept 625933852 1 625966852 383.064 .000 9^48 1.000 
Experience 5197983 2 2598991 1.59 .227 .132 .298 
Error 34316222 21 1634105 
* p < .05. 
Image Time Main Effect Interpretation: Level of Automation. The derived F=.515 
for the level of automation main effect did not exceed the tabled critical value F=4.33 at 
p=.05 with dfi=T and df2=21. Therefore, it is concluded that the mean image processing 
time for MBC (M=3532.708, SD=970.16) was not significantly different from the mean 
image processing time for MBE (M=3689.750, SD=1144.40), F(l,21)=.515, p>.05. In 
terms of hypothesis two, it appears that the differences in image processing times among 
the MBC and MBE groups are non-significant. 
Image Time Main Effect Interpretation: Experience. The derived F=\ .59 for the 
experience main effect did not exceed the tabled critical value F=3.47 at p=.05 with 
dfi=2 and df2=21. Therefore, it is concluded that there are no significant differences 
among the mean image processing times for the Pilot (M=4072.500, SD=1403.55), ATC 
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(M=3327.125, SD=865.54), and control (M=3434.062, SD=728.17) groups, 
F(2,21)=1.59, p>.05. In terms of hypothesis six, it appears that the differences in image 
processing times among Pilot, ATC, and control groups are non-significant. 
Image Time Interaction Interpretation: Level of Automation by Experience. The 
derived F=.165 for the level of automation x experience interaction did not exceed the 
tabled critical value F=3.47 at p=.05 with dfi=2 and df2=21. Therefore, it is concluded 
that the interaction between the level of automation and experience levels on image 
processing times is non-significant, F(2,21)=.165, p>.05. In terms of hypothesis nine, it 
appears that the interaction between the level of automation and the experience levels on 
image processing times is non-significant. 
MMI Processing Time 
Table 7 illustrates the ANOVA results on MMI processing time. 
Table 7 
ANOVA Source Table for MMI Processing Time (ms) 
Source SS df MS f P 
Eta 
Squared Power 
Within Subjects 
LOA 
LOA*Experience 
Error (LOA) 
572033 
2285095 
30742643 
1 572033 
2 1142547 
21 1463935 
.391 
.780 
.539 
.471 
.018 
.069 
.092 
.165 
Between Subjects 
Intercept 
Experience 
Error 
3272909670 
3045872 
183558423 
1 3272909670 
2 1522936 
21 8740877 
374.437 
.174 
.000 
.841 
.947 
.016 
1.000 
.074 
*p<.05. 
MMI Main Effect Interpretation: Level of Automation. The derived F=.39\ for 
the level of automation main effect did not exceed the tabled critical value F=4.33 at 
p=.05 with dfi=l and df2=2\. Therefore, it is concluded that the mean MMI processing 
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time for MBC (M=8366.625, SD=2331.85) was not significantly different from the mean 
MMI processing time for MBE (M=8148.292, SD=2027.73), F(l,21)=.391,/?>.05. In 
terms of hypothesis two, it appears that the differences in image processing times among 
the MBC and MBE groups are non-significant. 
MMI Main Effect Interpretation: Experience. The derived F=. 174 for the 
experience main effect did not exceed the tabled critical value F=3.47 at/?=05 with df=2 
and df2=2\. Therefore, it is concluded that there are no significant differences among the 
mean MMI processing times for the Pilot (M=8612.625, SD=3078.55), ATC 
(M=8055.875, SD=1530.19), and control (M=8103.875, SD=1799.37) groups, 
F(2,21)=.174,p>.05. In terms of hypothesis six, it appears that the differences in MMI 
processing times among Pilot, ATC, and control groups are non-significant. 
MMI Interaction Interpretation: Level of Automation by Experience. The derived 
F=.780 for the level of automation x experience interaction did not exceed the tabled 
critical value F=3.47 at;?=05 with df\=2 and df2=2l. Therefore, it is concluded that the 
interaction between the level of automation and experience levels on MMI processing 
times is non-significant, F(2,21)=.780,/?>.05. In terms of hypothesis nine, it appears that 
the interaction between the level of automation and the experience levels on MMI 
processing times is non-significant. 
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IA Processing Time 
Table 8 illustrates the ANOVA results on IA processing time. 
Table 8 
ANOVA Source Table for IA Processing Time (ms) 
Source SS df MS f P 
Eta 
Squared Power 
Within Subjects 
LOA 
LOA*Experience 
Error (LOA) 
3884563 
21439361 
89614478 
1 3884563 
2 10719680 
21 4267356 
.910 
2.512 
.351 
.105 
.042 
.193 
.149 
.447 
Between Subjects 
Intercept 
Experience 
Error 
2502466449 
66253778 
490050601 
1 250246649 
2 33126889 
21 23335742 
107.237 
1.420 
.000 
.264 
.836 
.119 
1.000 
.270 
*p < .05. 
IA Main Effect Interpretation: Level of Automation. The derived F=.910 for the 
level of automation main effect did not exceed the tabled critical value F=4.33 at/?=05 
with dfi=l and dfi=2\. Therefore, it is concluded that the mean IA processing time for 
MBC (M=7504.917, SD=4368.12) was not significantly different from the mean IA 
processing time for MBE (M=6935.958, SD=3152.00), F(l,21)=.910,/?>.05. In terms of 
hypothesis two, it appears that the differences in IA processing times among the MBC 
and MBE groups are non-significant. 
IA Main Effect Interpretation: Experience. The derived F=l .420 for the 
experience main effect did not exceed the tabled critical value F=3.47 at/^.05 with df=2 
and dfi=2\. Therefore, it is concluded that there are no significant differences among the 
mean IA processing times for the Pilot (M=8878.625, SD-5808.26), ATC (M=6300.563, 
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SD=2143.88), and control (M=6482.125, SD=2384.19) groups, F(2,21)=1.420,jp>.05. In 
terms of hypothesis six, it appears that the differences in IA processing times among 
Pilot, ATC, and control groups are non-significant. 
IA Interaction Interpretation: Level of Automation by Experience. The derived 
F=2.512 for the level of automation x experience interaction did not exceed the tabled 
critical value F=3.47 at/?=.05 with df=2 and df2=2l. Therefore, it is concluded that the 
interaction between the level of automation and experience levels on Al processing times 
is non-significant, F(2,21)=2.512,/?>.05. In terms of hypothesis nine, it appears that the 
interaction between the level of automation and the experience levels on Al processing 
times is non-significant. 
Subjective Workload 
Workload was measured subjectively using the NASA-TLX workload rating 
scale. Hypotheses three, seven, and ten refer to workload. Hypothesis three predicted that 
MBE automation strategies would result in lower workload scores than MBC automation 
strategies. Hypothesis seven predicted that the ATC group would result in lower 
workload scores than the Pilot group and the control group. Hypothesis ten predicted that 
an interaction would exist among the level of automation and the user experience groups 
for workload. To test these hypotheses, a repeated measures factorial ANOVA was 
conducted on the workload dependent variable. 
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Subjective Workload Results 
Table 9 illustrates the ANOVA results on subjective workload. 
Table 9 
ANOVA Source Table for Workload 
Source SS df MS / P Eta Squared Power 
Within Subjects 
LOA 
LOA* Experience 
Error (LOA) 
6.750 
324.125 
3037.125 
1 6.750 
2 162.062 
21 144.625 
.047 
1.121 
.831 
.345 
.002 
.096 
.055 
.220 
Between Subjects 
Intercept 
Experience 
Error 
70074.083 
3180.792 
9869.125 
1 700074.083 
2 1590.396 
21 469.958 
149.107 
3.384 
.000 
.053 
.877 
.244 
1.000 
.573 
*p < .05. 
Workload Main Effect Interpretation: Level of Automation. The derived F=.047 
for the level of automation main effect did not exceed the tabled critical value F=4.33 at 
p=.05 with df=l and df2=2\. Therefore, it is concluded that the mean workload scores 
for MBC (M=37.833, SD=16.88) was not significantly different from the mean workload 
scores for MBE (M=38.583, SD=20.70), F(l,21)=.047,/?>.05. In terms of hypothesis 
three, it appears that the differences in workload scores among the MBC and MBE 
groups are non-significant. 
Workload Main Effect Interpretation: Experience. The derived F=3.384 for the 
experience main effect did not exceed the tabled critical value F=3.47 at/?=05 with df\=2 
and df2=2\. Therefore, it is concluded that there are no significant differences among the 
mean IA processing times for the Pilot (M=26.938, SD=19.84), ATC (M=45.875, 
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SD=17.10), and control (M=41.812, SD=11.54) groups, F(2,21)=3.384,/?>.05. In terms 
of hypothesis seven, it appears that the differences in workload scores among Pilot, ATC, 
and control groups are non-significant. 
Workload Interaction Interpretation: Level of Automation X Experience. The 
derived F= 1.121 for the level of automation x experience interaction did not exceed the 
tabled critical value F=3.47 at/?=05 with dfy^l and df2=2l. Therefore, it is concluded 
that the interaction between the level of automation and experience levels on workload 
scores is non-significant, F(2,21)=1.121, j9>.05. In terms of hypothesis ten, it appears that 
the interaction between the level of automation and the experience levels on workload 
scores is non-significant. 
Subjective Situation Awareness 
SA was measured subjectively using the PSAQ questionnaire. Hypotheses four, 
eight, and eleven refer to SA. Hypothesis four predicted that MBC automation strategies 
would result in higher SA scores than MBE automation strategies. Hypothesis eight 
predicted that the Pilot group would result in higher S A scores than the ATC group and 
the control group. Hypothesis eleven predicted that an interaction would exist between 
the level of automation and experience levels for SA. To test these hypotheses, a repeated 
measures factorial ANOVA was conducted on the SA dependent variable. 
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Subjective Situation Awareness Results 
Table 10 illustrates the ANOVA results on subjective situation awareness. 
Table 10 
ANOVA Source Table for Situation Awareness 
Source SS df MS f P 
Eta 
Squared Power 
Within Subjects 
LOA 
LOA* Experience 
Error (LOA) 
.013 
.366 
3.082 
1 .013 .086 
2 .183 1.245 
21 .147 
.772 
.308 
.004 
.106 
.059 
.241 
Between Subjects 
Intercept 
Experience 
Error 
834.667 
.118 
15.802 
1 834.667 1109.228 
2 .059 .078 
21 .752 
.000 
.925 
.981 
.007 
1.000 
.060 
*p < .05. 
SA Main Effect Interpretation: Level of Automation. The derived F=.086 for the 
level of automation main effect did not exceed the tabled critical value F=4.33 at/?=.05 
with df\=\ and <#2=21. Therefore, it is concluded that the mean workload scores for 
MBC (M=4.154, SD=.600) was not significantly different from the mean workload 
scores for MBE (M=4.186, SD=694), F(l,21)=.086,/?>.05. In terms of hypothesis four, 
it appears that the differences in SA scores among the MBC and MBE groups are non-
significant. 
SA Main Effect Interpretation: Experience. The derived F=.078 for the 
experience main effect did not exceed the tabled critical value F=3.47 atp=05 with df\=2 
and dfi=2l. Therefore, it is concluded that there are no significant differences among the 
mean IA processing times for the Pilot (M=4.136, SD=.616), ATC (M=4.240, SD=584), 
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and control (M=4.134, SD=777) groups, F(2,21)=.078,/?>.05. In terms of hypothesis 
eight, it appears that the differences in SA scores among Pilot, ATC, and control groups 
are non-significant. 
SA Interaction Interpretation: Level of Automation X Experience. The derived 
F= 1.245 for the level of automation x experience interaction did not exceed the tabled 
critical value F=3.47 atp=.05 with df=2 and df2=2l. Therefore, it is concluded that the 
interaction between the level of automation and experience levels on SA scores is non-
significant, F(2,21)=1.245, j?>.05. In terms of hypothesis eleven, it appears that the 
interaction between the level of automation and the experience levels on SA scores is 
non-significant. 
Overall, the results indicate that there are no significant differences found among 
level of automation, experience, or an interaction thereof. 
Discussion 
The objective of this study was to analyze the effects of level of automation and 
the type of prior experience a simulated pilot has on UAS operations in the areas of 
performance and perception. Accuracy and time performance were both measured 
objectively, while workload and situation awareness were measured subjectively. In other 
words, the study intended to see if different experiences in the aviation domain attributed 
to better performance and SA while acting as a pilot-in-command of an UAS simulator. 
Varying levels of automation were also used to determine whether users with specific 
KSAs performed in a more cooperative and coordinated manner when combined with a 
specific automation level. The results of the study were divided into four areas of focus: 
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image accuracy, task processing time, subjective workload, and subjective situation 
awareness. 
Image Accuracy 
Image accuracy scores were collected automatically from the MIIIRO software. 
Image accuracy scores were calculated by determining the number of correctly processed 
images divided by the total number of images presented in each mission scenario. An 
image was correctly processed if the image is accepted when a 'threat target' is present, 
and if the image is rejected when there are no 'threat targets' in the image. Additionally, 
the accuracy of the Automatic Target Recognizer (ATR) was set to 80%. Therefore, 
automation would correctly designate the targets as threats/non-threats 80% of the time. 
The image processing task was deemed as the primary task. 
The results of the image accuracy scores did not indicate any significant 
differences, regardless of the level of automation, or the experience level of the 
participant. The lack of significance was in contrast to hypothesis one and five. The 
results found in this current study indicate that the accuracy rate was 95% for MBC and 
96% for MBE, with a SD of 8.4% and 6.7% respectively. This implies that if the 
participant relied solely on automation during the MBE mission scenario, they would 
reside outside one standard deviation of the mean. With the same ATR accuracy rate of 
80%, Wasson (2005) found slightly lower results during the same two mission scenarios 
with a MBC and MBE accuracy percentage of 89% and 88% respectively, which is 
ultimately an average decrease of 2 out of the 30 images presented to the simulated pilot. 
A comparison of the results are displayed in figure 10. 
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Target Image Accuracy 
Figure 10. Comparison chart of task times for similar mission scenarios (data extracted 
from Wasson, 2005) 
Subjective feedback obtained from the PSAQ questionnaire highlighted several 
factors that may contribute to a non-significant difference among the image accuracy 
means among prior experience and levels of automation. First, the majority of the images 
were easily deciphered at first glance, while a select few were rather obscure in detail In 
other words, it was easy to distinguish the threats from the non-threats in the vast 
majority of the images. Yet a few of the images left very little evidence to distinguish 
between the targets, no matter how long the image was observed. For the non-obvious 
images, it was more of a guessing game, rather than a need to further analyze the image. 
Therefore, a quick decision and response could be made at first glance. Some participants 
revealed that even in cases where there was minimal doubt, they would not risk targeting 
a 'friendly', or non-threat. This type of rationale was never anticipated by the author of 
this research, but possibly played a significant role in the outcome of the accuracy scores. 
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More details on this issue will be discussed in the Recommendations for Future Research 
section. 
Task Processing Time 
Image Processing Time. Task processing times were collected automatically by 
the MIIIRO software. The image processing time pertains to the average amount of time 
it took for a participant to respond and fully process an image, by discerning 'threat' 
vehicles from 'non-threat' vehicles. The results of these image processing times did not 
indicate any significant differences, regardless of the level of automation, or the 
experience level of the participant. This is in contrast to hypotheses two, six, and nine. 
Past research has suggested that image processing times were higher during the MBE 
level of automation, due to the participant relying on automation to process the image in a 
minimum of 15 seconds. Using an identical mission scenario, Wasson (2005) indicated 
that participants processed images at an average rate of 4564ms for MBC and 5965ms for 
MBE, whereas the results in this current study indicate that participants processed images 
at an average rate of 3533ms for MBC and 3689ms for MBE. A reasonable explanation 
for the faster processing times may be that there was a large monetary incentive for the 
top performer in speed and accuracy of the primary task. An alternative explanation for 
the faster processing times could be due to the targeted groups of participants selected in 
this study to satisfy the levels of experience criteria. Additionally, the MBE option was 
very rarely used among participants. In fact, data collected by the MIIIRO software 
indicated that the most it was ever used by any single participant was once. Ruff et. al. 
(2004) pointed out that participant's typically responded to images rather than allowing 
automation to process them. This finding is also supported by Olson & Sarter (1998), 
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specifically among experienced pilots conducting flight tasks under MBC/MBE 
strategies. This study found that all three levels of experience (pilot, ATC, and control 
group) chose to process the images on their own, rather than rely on MBE strategies. 
MMI Processing Time. There were also two secondary task processing times 
collected automatically by the MIIIRO software: MMI times, and IA times. Essentially, 
each of these tasks competed for the same mental resources as the primary task. The 
MMI times reflect the amount of time it took a participant to become aware of an 
abnormal MMI indication of yellow or red (indicating a need for a response), and 
respond to it by clicking directly on the indicator and typing in a string of numbers 
displayed in the resulting pop-up box. The results of these MMI processing times did not 
indicate any significant differences, regardless of the level of automation, or the 
experience level of the participant. This is in contrast to hypotheses two, six, and nine. 
These results concur with Wasson's (2005) study, where the average MMI processing 
times were 8926ms for MBC and 10996ms for MBE, whereas the results in this current 
study indicate that participants processed images at an average rate of 8367ms for MBC 
and 8148ms for MBE. Once again, the faster processing times may be attributed to the 
monetary incentive for the top performer in the primary task (despite this was not part of 
the primary task). 
IA Processing Times. The IA times reflect the amount of time it took a participant 
to become aware of I A, and respond to it by clicking directly on the IA icon and typing in 
the revealed code 'daytona' in the resulting pop-up box. The results of the mean IA 
processing times did not indicate any significant differences, regardless of the level of 
automation, or the experience level of the participant. This is in contrast to hypotheses 
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two, six, and nine. These results concur with Wasson's (2005) study, where the average 
IA processing times were 8752ms for MBC and 7997ms for MBE, whereas the results in 
this current study indicate that participants processed images at a faster average rate of 
7505ms for MBC and 6936ms for MBE. Once again, the faster processing times may be 
attributed to the monetary incentive for the top performer in the primary task (despite this 
was not part of the primary task). 
Overall, these results suggest that the differences in mean processing times among 
the primary and secondary tasks were non-significant among both the level of automation 
and the prior experiences of the participant groups. It is noteworthy that response times 
are indicative of adequate SA, alertness, scanning abilities, and responses times, yet two 
out of three of the quickest responders were among the control group, having no flight or 
ATC experience. Additionally, the top two fastest responders were the only participants 
who indicated computer gaming experience beyond the '0-5 hour' choice in the 
biographical questionnaire. In both cases the highest choice of '20-25+' hours of 
computer gaming per week was selected. 
Subjective feedback obtained from the PSAQ questionnaire revealed several 
theories as to why task processing times were comparatively quick. First, participants 
indicated that the overall mission was simple enough to quickly detect and react to all 
three timed events. The image processing task was deemed easily mediated, as any 
additional time spent on the task would not alter the initial decision of deciphering 
'threats' from 'non-threats'. Additionally, unlike the MMI, the IA was easily 
recognizable since it instantly appeared as a "bright red blip" on the display. The MMI 
was said to be a bit trickier, since all three lights were continuously present, and the 
63 
The Effect of Learned 64 
changes in brightness were harder to detect. Perhaps, if the primary task was more 
complex and required more time to process, than all three task times would have been 
increased. On the other hand, participants acknowledged that it was difficult to stay 
focused on the mission, and often felt as if they were just responding to event occurrences 
rather than actually processing information and making decisions. It was often revealed 
that the cash incentive of $100 for being the top performer encouraged quick and 
attentive responses. This notion is supported by comparing the task response times with 
a former between-subjects study using an identical mission scenario, with a $20 incentive 
prize. An overview of the task times comparing the two studies are displayed in figure 
11, An alternate theory may suggest that the time differences were due to the addition of 
the targeted experience levels presented in this study. 
MBC 
IA Time 
MMI Time 
•jsj Image Time 3 
Past Study 
i Present Study 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 
Time(ms) 
Figure 11. Comparison chart of task times for similar mission scenarios (data extracted 
from Wasson, 2005) 
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Subjective Workload 
The NASA-TLX workload assessment was introduced to the participant prior to 
the training session. It was then described in greater detail and completed by the 
participant following each mission. The results of the mean workload scores did not 
indicate any significant differences, regardless of the level of automation, or the 
experience level of the participant. This is in contrast to hypotheses three, seven, and ten. 
Past studies reveal that the Modified Cooper-Harper scale may not have been 
sensitive of specific enough to analyze workload on the MIIIRO simulator (Wasson, 
2005; Ruff et a l , 2004). Therefore, the NASA-TLX was used for this study. A statistical 
analysis revealed that the significance level among the three levels of experience was 
.052 with a power level of .573. The mean workload score of the pilot group was 27, in 
comparison to the mean workload scores of ATC and control groups of 46 and 42, 
respectively. Yet, each participant experienced the same exact mission scenarios. This 
supports the notion that there were few differences that existed between the MBC and 
MBE mission scenarios. In other words, if the participant ignores the automated 
capabilities that are offered during the MBE mission scenario, then they are essentially 
performing the same mission as if they were operating under MBC strategies. The two 
mission scenarios were nearly identical, with the addition of MBE capabilities. Since 
both levels of automation were performed by each participant, there was opportunity for 
each participant to rate one scenario above the other, but this was not the case. 
Furthermore, the only workload measure that came close to showing any significance 
was a result of the pilot group indicating lower workload scores than the ATC and control 
groups, despite performing the same mission scenarios. It is a possibility that a pilot's 
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perception of workload under the tested conditions are in direct comparison to actually 
flying an aircraft, whereas no other tested group can make this comparison. 
Subjective Situation Awareness 
A modified PSAQ questionnaire was introduced to the participant prior to the 
training session. It was then described in greater detail and completed by the participant 
following each mission. The results of the mean SA scores did not indicate any 
significant differences, regardless of the level of automation, or the experience level of 
the participant. This is in contrast to hypotheses four, eight, and eleven. 
It became apparent during the literature review that measuring SA while 
measuring workload could be beneficial. Often times, while working with automation, 
workload may decrease but also result in SA decrements. Therefore, the PSAQ 
questionnaire was modified to evaluate participant SA in several areas and tasks related 
to the simulated mission scenarios. This also presented an opportunity to gain participant 
feedback over all areas of the experiment. 
Differences in SA appeared to be non-significant among all tested groups. A 
possibility for these results is due to the inability for the participant to get any feedback 
on their performance. In most cases, if the participant missed an MMI or IA event, they 
remained unaware of doing so. The participants were never aware of their performance 
in the primary and secondary tasks nor did they have a foundation to base their 
performance on. Simply put, they were not aware of what they weren't aware of. 
Indicated SA scores remained high across all participants, regardless of their actual 
performance. 
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The feedback section in the PSAQ questionnaire was useful in determining how 
participants perceived the mission scenario. For instance, it was common for participants 
to mention how the IA events were much more recognizable than the MMI events. Other 
participants mentioned how they neglected to pay attention to the majority of the Tactical 
Situation Display, since all tasks could be accomplished by focusing on the uppermost 
section of the display. As a result, attention was completely detracted from the aircraft in 
accordance with its location on the map. Participants also advised that their performance 
was not degraded due to lack of attention, but because the events often took place all at 
once, forcing them to prioritize which tasks to respond to first. It was common for a 
participant to reveal that they remained attentive primarily due to the monetary incentive 
or the "challenge" posed against the other groups. SA results may have varied without the 
cash incentive or the competition, as both were compelling characteristics of the 
experiment. Additionally, adding the MBE option on the primary task seemed to add 
another element that most participants thought was more of a nuisance than a help. 
Lastly, participants indicated that the tasks were too simple and became boring. 
Overall, the experiment did not reveal any significant differences among level of 
automation and user experience levels. 
Study Limitations 
The primary constraint that incurred throughout this study was the simulation test-
bed design. Although this research did not detect any significant differences among the 
KSAs of individual experiences, it can be reasonably theorized that differences still exist. 
It became apparent during the experiment that participants acted more as responders 
rather than troubleshooters. This was partly due to the task requirements implemented in 
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the design. The design relied on the scanning capabilities and response times of the 
participants, rather than extensive decision making, troubleshooting, or strategizing 
abilities. This ultimately relieved the participants from having to perform with the use of 
prior knowledge and training. Thus, knowledge played an insignificant role, yet it is the 
knowledge-base that ultimately separates the participants among the three experience 
groups. A more appropriate setup would have required a testbed design that allowed for 
the participant to interact more as an operator, rather than a monitor. This would allow 
the simulated pilots to further exploit his/her knowledge base, specifically in the areas of 
detect, sense and avoid (DSA), operating procedures, and troubleshooting lost 
communications. However, the real-world role of a UAS operator is still unknown, and a 
certifiable user-interface has yet to be discovered. 
Additionally, the MBC and MBE settings for either particular mission scenario 
did not make any significant changes. It may be advantageous if these individual settings 
resulted in more extreme differences. Overall, the mission scenarios were too simple, and 
the level of automation did not play a large factor in performance. The overall complexity 
of the mission was too easy and required minimal mental processing ability to complete. 
There are a variety of UASs, and the option of user-interfaces are vast. Fixating on a 
highly automated and restrictive testbed may ultimately restrict research potential. It 
would be beneficial to invest in a testbed that allows for more design flexibility and 
capabilities. 
The primary task associated with the processing images did not require much time 
or mental processing to accomplish. The images used in this study were purposely set at a 
very low resolution in an effort to require the participant to spend more time analyzing it. 
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However, participants were still capable of making processing decisions at first glance. In 
other words, looking at the image longer did not alter their level of certainty in 
distinguishing threats from non-threats. Perhaps a new set of images would have made 
this task more appropriate for distinguishing experience characteristics. This issue will be 
discussed more in the Recommendations for Future Research section of this report. 
Furthermore, during the MBE scenarios, the time-out period for automatic image 
processing was 15 seconds. This provided ample time for the participant to process the 
image on their own. Perhaps, if the time-out period was reduced, participants would have 
relied more on the higher level of automation to assist them with the primary task. 
The sample population used in this study may have played a contributing factor in 
the lack of differences among participants with varying expertise and experiences. All 
participants were relatively inexperienced, when compared to individuals who have 
worked in the respective professions for several years. Due to financial and time 
constraints, it was infeasible to acquire well-experienced participants for this particular 
study. Furthermore, the sample size was relatively small, mainly due to money and time 
constraints, but also due to the timing in which the experiment took place. All of the 
participants were selected during the summer months, thereby reducing the population 
size. However, in order to obtain a reasonable power size, statistical power calculations 
revealed that it probably would have required a much larger sample size than what would 
have been feasible for this type of research. 
It is evident that a pilot study would have been useful in directing the outcome of 
the current research. The intent of the author was to apply a new independent variable 
(i.e. Experience), to a past research design (see Wasson, 2005) in order to determine if 
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piloting or air traffic control experience may have played a significant role in their 
findings. If a pilot study was conducted prior to the current research, than the outcome of 
this study may have been foreseen, and modifications could have been made to allow for 
a more appropriate approach in determining the impact of experience on UAS piloting 
ability. Nevertheless, it may still hold true that significant difference in UAS piloting 
abilities are not reliant on the prior experience levels tested. 
Practical Implications 
This research is the first of its kind at an attempt to distinguish personal 
differences among potential UAS pilots with various backgrounds. Although no 
significant differences were discovered, this research can be used as a good starting point 
for setting up future testbeds to better analyze individual characteristics. 
Current UAS designs are vast, and new concepts and innovations continue to 
unveil. Much research is still needed to uncover how automation strategies should be 
implemented in a system design, as well as the necessary skillsets required on behalf of 
the PIC. Does piloting experience play an issue in UAS operations? Will shared-fate alter 
decision making if the pilot is not co-located with the aircraft? There are still several 
questions left unanswered and should be figured out in a lab rather than being answered 
at the expense of human lives in the air or on the ground. By nature, UAS interface 
laboratory testing can simulate just about every scenario that can be experienced in actual 
operations. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
UAS research offers a wide variety of testing options that can essentially replicate 
real-world operations. Based on this current study, it would be advisable to further 
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investigate options that are allowed by the MIIIRO software. This current research was 
an extension of two mission scenarios that were designed in a prior study in order to 
make direct comparisons of the results, with the addition of using targeted populations. It 
was discovered that the level of automation played a very small role in altering the 
involvement of the participant. 
Additionally, emphasis should be directed on the primary task images. The 
current images require little time and effort to process. A different approach may be to 
collect birds-eye imagery from a source, such as Google Earth, that require the 
participant to scan and locate and designate specific items (such as basketball courts, 
swimming pools, or landing strips). This will eliminate the unnecessary decision to 
target threats from non-threats. Participant feedback in this study suggested that some 
users based their decision around whether to risk the lives of friendly targets. It will also 
require the simulated pilot to filter out an abundance of 'noise' in order to locate specific 
targets. Furthermore, this type of task will always remain open-ended, meaning the pilot 
in command will always have some level of doubt as to whether all targets are discovered 
and if the image should be accepted or rejected. In using this type of imagery, pilots, for 
instance, may have a higher confidence level in processing these images, due to their 
flight experience. 
Research should also examine how various levels of expertise perform tasks 
related to in-flight planning, especially in the area of unexpected events. The current 
study examined how a participant would respond to known and foreseen events. They 
merely needed to respond to these events, rather than make think critically and make 
decisions. If this type of thinking was all that was needed in the realm of aviation, than 
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pilots and controllers would not require much training. In fact, these unforeseen 
challenges in an ever-changing airspace environment is why it is so imperative that the 
human component remain in-the-loop of the system operation. Significant differences 
may be discovered among various user experiences if the missions allow additional 
flexibility for the user to become more involved in the actual mission (i.e. re-route 
aircraft around weather and traffic in order to complete a series of tasks). 
Subjective workload and SA should be investigated further, perhaps objectively. 
It is also recommended that these measurements take place during extremely demanding 
situations requiring a high level of user involvement, as well as relatively boring 
situations requiring low levels of user involvement. It is also advisable to apply workload 
and SA ratings on specific tasks, rather than the overall mission. This will allow 
researchers to discern between tasks that lessen workload while maintaining or increasing 
SA. 
Lastly, it is worth reiterating that the top performer in this study was among the 
baseline group and had no prior aviation training. The top two performers in the study 
were the only participants who indicated on the biographical questionnaire that they are 
avid computer gamers. The third top performer was neither a computer gamer, nor had 
prior aviation training, but used a computer more hours per week than any other 
participant. Future research may want to investigate whether computer familiarity plays 
an important role in conducting UAS operations from a PC-based operating platform. 
Conclusion 
UASs are on the verge of taking flight alongside manned counterparts. In fact, 
their presence in the military arsenal is well known and admired for their superior 
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capabilities. Several other entities have witnessed the expansive opportunities that UASs 
have to offer, and are seeking ways to exploit this technology. However, regulatory 
constraints will not permit UAS operation in the NAS until technological constraints and 
human factors concerns have been overcome. Removing the human component from the 
flying platform poses several advantages, but does not come without an abundance of 
risk. 
This study has initiated a much needed area of research pertaining to the user-
interface design, as well as understanding the capabilities and KSAs required on behalf of 
the pilot. Unfortunately, no significant differences were determined among the 
experience levels of the simulated pilot, nor the level of automation that was 
implemented into the system design. The possibility of replicating realistic, real-world 
UAS operations in a laboratory setting should be enough motivation to further this type 
of research in a simulated environment, rather than allowing shortfalls to be discovered at 
the expense of human life. 
The results discovered in this study revealed that humans, regardless of prior 
training in aviation realms, can perform substantially well under foreseen and expected 
circumstances. However, pilots are expected to remain in-the-loop of UAS operations for 
reasons that automation cannot mediate- the unforeseen, unexpected, and unintended 
situations. It is for this reason that future research should be carried out in these areas to 
determine the best approach at aligning adequate UAS pilots with an appropriately level 
of automation in an effort to promote coordinated team-play. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Automation and Pilot Selection Study 
Conducted by Chris Reynolds 
Advisor: Dr. Dahai Liu 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
600 S. Clyde Morris Blvd, Daytona Beach, FL 32114 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of automation styles and learned 
skill-sets on performance, workload, and situation awareness. This experiment consists 
of one session that will last approximately one hour. During this session, you will be 
asked to complete two computer-based UAS simulation trials and fill out questionnaires 
regarding your perceived feeling of situation awareness and workload. 
Your participation in this study will help us determine an appropriate level of 
automation and help distinguish potential pilot candidates for future UASs. There are no 
known risks associated with this experiment. The data collected from your participation 
will remain completely anonymous. You will be compensated for your participation with 
a $15.00 cash incentive and will be eligible to receive a $50.00 cash prize for best overall 
performance. You may terminate your participation at any time. 
Thank you for your participation. If you have any questions, please ask during the 
experiment, or call Chris Reynolds at 719.640.7142 or Dr. Dahai Liu at 386.226.6214. 
Statement of Consent 
I acknowledge that my participation in this experiment is entirely voluntary and 
that I am free to withdraw at any time. I have been informed as to the general scientific 
purposes of the experiment and that I will receive $15.00 for completion of this study and 
will be eligible to receive $50.00 in the event that I have the best overall task 
performance in the entire study. Both rewards are contingent upon completion. 
I acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to obtain additional information 
regarding the study and that any questions I have raised have been answered to my full 
satisfaction. 
I have read and fully understand the consent form and I sign it freely and 
voluntarily. 
Participant's Name: 
Participant's Signature: Date 
Experimenter Signature: Date 
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Appendix B 
Biographical Information Questionnaire 
Please fill in the blanks or circle the appropriate response. 
1. What is your age? years 
2. What is your gender? M / F 
3. Do you have normal or corrected to 20/20 vision? Yes / No 
4. Are you color blind? Yes /No 
5. Are you: R-handed / L - handed 
6. What is your current learned skill-set? Pilot ATC Other 
a. If Pilot: 
i. What is the highest rating you hold? Private Instrument 
Commercial 
ii. What is your total PIC time (approx.)? hours 
iii. What is your total Instrument (including simulated) time? hours 
iv. Are you current? Yes /No 
v. How many hours have you flown in the past month (approx.)? 
hours 
b. If ATC: 
i. Check the courses that you have completed or are currently enrolled in? 
ATM-I ATM-II ATM-Ill ATM-IV ATM-V 
VFR Control Tower/AT315 Non-Radar ATC/AT406__ 
ii. How many hours have you spent performing ATC-based duties within the 
last month: hours 
7. How many hours per week do you use computers: hours 
8. On a scale of 1 to 5, what is your confidence level in using computers: 
LOW confidence 1 2 3 4 5 HIGH confidence 
9. On average, how many hours per week do you spend playing computer games? 
0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25+ 
10. What type of genre of gaming are you most accustomed to playing? 
Action Adventure Role-Playing Strategy 
Simulation 
11. Have you had any other experience participating in unmanned aircraft simulation? Yes / 
No 
12. Do you have any experience flying unmanned aircraft or remote controlled aircraft? Yes / 
No 
a. If so, please explain: 
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Appendix C 
NASA Task Load Index (TLX) Form (Presented after the completion of each trial) 
We are interested in your subjective experience of workload. Workload is a difficult concept to define precisely, but 
a simple one to understand generally. The factors that influence your experience of workload may come from the task 
itself, your feelings about your own performance, how much effort you put in, or the stress and frustration you felt. 
One way to find out about workload is to ask people to describe the feelings they experienced. Because workload 
may be caused by many different factors, we would like you to evaluate several of them individually rather than 
lumping them into a single global evaluation of overall workload. This set of six rating scales was developed for you to 
use in evaluating your experiences during the test trial. 
Please indicate the level of workload you experienced on each of the 6 scales by circling the line at the point which 
best reflects the level of workload you experienced. The ends of the scales are labeled to indicate very low and very 
high workload. Points in between those end points represent intermediate values of workload. Please note that the 
Performance scale goes from Good on the left to Bad on the right. This order has been confusing for some people. 
EFFORT — How hard did you have to work (mentally and physically) to accomplish your level of 
performance? 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Low High 
PERFORMANCE — How successful do you think you were in accomplishing the goals of the task set by 
the experimenter (or yourself)? How satisfied were you with your performance in accomplishing these 
goals? 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Good Poor 
FRUSTRATION LEVEL — How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed, and annoyed versus secure, 
gratified, content, relaxed, and complacent did you feel during the task? 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Low High 
TEMPORAL DEMAND — How much time pressure did you feel due to the rate or pace at which the 
tasks or events occurred? Was the pace slow and leisurely, or rapid and frantic? 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Low High 
MENTAL DEMAND — How much mental and perceptual activity was required (e.g., thinking, deciding, 
calculating, remembering, looking, searching)? Was the task easy or demanding, simple or complex, 
forgiving or exacting ? 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Low High 
PHYSICAL DEMAND — How much physical activity was required (e.g., pushing, pulling, turning, 
controlling, activating)? Was the task physically easy or demanding, slow or brisk, slack or strenuous, 
restful or laborious? 
Low High 
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NASA Task Load Index (TLX) Weighting Form 
The forms you filled out included six rating scale factors that can influence workload. We are interested in 
your assessment of the relative contribution of these factors to your experience of workload. 
People vary in their opinion of what contributes to workload. For example, some people feel that mental or 
temporal demands are the essential aspects of workload regardless of the effort they expended or the 
performance they achieved. Others feel that if they performed well, the workload must have been low and 
if they performed poorly, the workload must have been high. Yet others feel that effort or feelings of 
frustration are the most important factors in workload, and so on. 
In addition, the factors that create levels of workload differ depending on the task. For example, some 
tasks might be difficult because they must be completed very quickly. Others may seem easy or hard 
because of the intensity of mental or physical effort required. Yet others feel difficult because they cannot 
be performed well, no matter how much effort is expended. 
The evaluation you are about to perform is a technique developed by NASA to assess the relative 
importance of the six factors that were included in the workload rating scale in determining how much 
workload you experienced across all the test trials you just completed. 
Below is a list of pairs of rating scale titles (for example Effort vs. Mental demand). For each pair, please 
circle the item that was more important to your experience of workload across all the test trials you just 
completed. 
MENTAL DEMAND 
TEMPORAL DEMAND 
PHYSICAL DEMAND 
EFFORT 
PERFORMANCE 
TEMPORAL DEMAND 
MENTAL DEMAND 
PERFORMANCE 
EFFORT 
TEMPORAL DEMAND 
EFFORT 
PHYSICAL DEMAND 
FRUSTRATION 
MENTAL DEMAND 
FRUSTRATION 
VS 
vs 
VS 
vs 
vs 
vs 
vs 
vs 
vs 
vs 
vs 
vs 
vs 
vs 
vs 
PHYSICAL DEMAND 
MENTAL DEMAND 
TEMPORAL DEMAND 
PERFORMANCE 
FRUSTRATION 
PERFORMANCE 
PERFORMANCE 
PHYSICAL DEMAND 
FRUSTRATION 
EFFORT 
MENTAL DEMAND 
EFFORT 
TEMPORAL DEMAND 
FRUSTRATION 
PHYSICAL DEMAND 
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Appendix D 
Post-Trial Participant Subjective SA Questionnaire (PSAQ) 
Name: Task: Date: 
Note: Definitions are provided for reference on the last page. 
1. Please circle the number that best describes how hard Not 
you were working during this scenario. hard 
Comments: 
1 2 3 4 5 Extremely hard 
2. Please circle the number that best describes how Extremely 
well you performed during this scenario. poor 
Comments: 
1 2 3 4 5 Extremely well 
3. Please circle the number that best describes how 
aware of the evolving situation you were during 
the scenario. 
Comments: 
Not aware 
of 
situation 
1 2 3 4 5 
Completely 
aware of 
situation 
4. Please circle the number that best describes how 
aware of Intruding Aircraft you were during the 
scenario. 
Comments: 
Not aware 
of 
situation 
1 2 3 4 5 
Completely 
aware of 
situation 
D-l 
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5. Please circle the number that best describes how 
aware of the Mission Mode Indicator you were 
during the scenario. 
Comments: 
Not aware 
of 
situation 
1 2 3 4 5 
Completely 
aware of 
situation 
6. Please circle the number that best describes how 
well you perceived the operating environment of 
the aircraft(s) in which you were flying. 
Comments: 
No mental 
perception 1 2 3 4 5 
Very high 
mental 
perception 
7. Please circle the number that best describes how 
well you perceived the future status of the 
aircraft(s) in which you were flying. 
Comments: 
No mental 
perception 1 2 3 4 5 
Very high 
mental 
perception 
8. Please circle the number that best describes how 
well you perceived the interaction of the 
aircraft(s) in which you were flying with the 
surrounding environment. 
Comments: 
No mental 
perception 1 2 3 4 5 
Very high 
mental 
perception 
Additional Comments: 
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PSAQ Definitions 
Hard Work: 
Refers to the overall amount of effort exerted to complete the mission scenario. This is 
an overall combination of: mental demand, physical demand, temporal/time demand, 
performance, effort, frustration, etc. 
Performance: 
Refers to how quickly and correctly you completed the tasks required of you during the 
mission scenario. 
Awareness: 
Refers to your ability to quickly and effectively comprehend what is taking place during 
specific occurrences in the mission scenario. 
Perception: 
Refers to how well you could visualize or create a mental picture of the situation in your 
head. 
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